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ARTICLES

Constitutional Bases for a Right of
Access to Counsel at the Pre-trial

Stages of Drunk Driving Prosecutions:
A Study in Conflicting Rights
RUSSELL
I.

G.

MURPHY*

INTRODUCTION

Alcohol-related traffic accidents represent one of the most serious
problems in contemporary American society.' A widespread and intensive public outcry against the "slaughter on our highways" 2 has
been directed at every level of government. Many states have responded
to this valid public pressure to reduce the number of deaths and serious
injuries caused by the drunk driver by strengthening and vigorously
enforcing laws dealing with those driving under the influence of
*Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; B.A., University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, 1966; J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1973.
The author wishes to thank Edward Bander, Law Librarian of Suffolk University Law School, and his research assistants for their support in the preparation of
this article. Special thanks are due Suzanne M. Riches, graduate in the Class of
1983 of the Law School, for her sustained contribution to the article.
1. See, e.g., ALCOHOL ABUSE AND HIGHWAY SAFETY IN MASSACHUSETTS, REPORT
OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND HIGHWAY SAFETY

(1982)

[hereinafter cited as ALCOHOL ABUSE]. The Report points out that in the United States
drunk drivers kill 25,000 and injure 750,000 people each year. This "means nearly
70 persons are killed and 2,054 seriously injured [each day] because of the drunk
driver." Id. at 1.
The United States Supreme Court has commented frequently on the magnitude
of the problem. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 920 (1983) ("The
situation underlying this case-that of the drunk driver-occurs with tragic frequency
on our nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented . . . ."); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("The slaughter on the highways of this nation exceeds the death toll
of all our wars." Id. at 657.); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) ("The
increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches
the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield.").
2. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
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alcohol. 3 An outgrowth of this phenomenon has been an increase in
the number of cases reaching appellate courts in which constitutional
challenges have been raised questioning the validity of drunk driving
laws and the manner of their enforcement. This article addresses one
controversial aspect of the "war" against drunk drivers-the procedural
rights of a person arrested for drunk driving under state "implied
consent" laws which govern the administration of blood alcohol content (BAC) analysis tests.' Specifically, the article examines the practical necessity and constitutional justification for a limited right of
access to counsel on the part of a person arrested for drunk driving

who must decide whether to submit to such tests.'
II.
A.

IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTES

FACTUAL SETTING

Legal and constitutional issues concerning the right to counsel
3. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, §§ 11-501 & 11-501.1 (1983); 1982
Mass. Acts, ch. 373, codified in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp.
1983-1984); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.19 & 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1982).
4. An "implied consent" law is one which conditions the right to possess
a driver's license on the licensee's consenting to some form of blood alcohol content
testing in the event of an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Blood
alcohol content (hereinafter referred to as "BAC") testing refers to any method of
chemical analysis of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the blood. The three
primary BAC testing methods are blood sampling, breath analysis and urinalysis.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel:
The Case Against Implied Consent, 58 TEX. L. REV. 935 (1980) (examination of
alternative constitutional bases for a right to counsel at testing stage of drunk driving prosecution; article proposed that implied consent statutes should be repealed
if courts impose an administratively cumbersome right to counsel); Note, Right to
Counsel for DUI in Nevada: A New Song for Gideon's Trumpet, 13 PAC. L.J. 1157
(1982) (discussion of the need for a right to counsel at testing stage to facilitate
imposition of heightened penalties for second or repeat offenders); Note, The Right
to Counsel Under California's Implied Consent Statute, 9 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV.
73 (1977) (analysis of a due process right to legal advice under California implied
consent statute).
The right proposed by this article is a restricted one. The state has an
acknowledged legitimate interest in enforcing drunk driving laws and, in particular,
in obtaining evidence of intoxication from BAC tests within a reasonable time after
arrest and before the evidence is lost. The contours of the right include: (1) a police
duty to inform the suspect that he may attempt to contact a lawyer prior to deciding
on submission to the test; (2) a reasonable opportunity for telephonic communication with counsel, with reasonableness measured in terms of time (at least one hour
or any period of time not jeopardizing effective testing) and the physical capabilities
of the accused; and (3) the establishment'of programs by the state to facilitate such
communication (e.g., lists of attorneys willing to accept phone calls).

[1984:203]

RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL

at the BAC analysis stage arise in a fairly common factual context.
Ordinarily, the police either observe erratic driving or a violation of
the traffic law, or they are summoned to the scene of an auto accident. Routine investigation, including the observation of a driver's
physical condition, response to questions, and the results of field

sobriety tests, 6 leads to a reasonable belief that a person has been
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA). An arrest is made.

Shortly thereafter the suspect7 will normally be given Miranda8 warnings and will be asked to undergo blood alcohol content analysis in

the form of a breathalyzer test, withdrawal of blood samples, or provision of a urine specimen." The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions rely primarily on the breathalyzer test." Although the timing
of the request for a BAC test may vary, it is most likely to occur

6. See Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 774, 438 N.E.2d 60, 62
(1982) (field sobriety tests required accused to touch nose, pick up coins, and walk
straight line); State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 110, 336 A.2d 244, 245 (1975) (field
sobriety tests include "balance, walking, turning, finger-to-nose, and coin pick-up
test"); People v. Mulack, 40 Ill. 2d 429, 430, 240 N.E.2d 633, 634 (1968) (visual
field tests for drunkenness require suspect to touch nose, pick up coins, walk, and
turn); see also State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 14, 268 A.2d 1, 8 (1970) (state has legal
right to require DUIA arrestees to submit to physical coordination tests).
Although the nature and type of field sobriety tests vary, the most commonly
administered tests require suspects to walk a straight line, heel to toe, and then reverse
direction; to stand erect, touch the index finger of each hand to the nose, and then
repeat the procedure with eyes closed; to stand erect and tilt head back; and to stand
on one leg. F.L.

BAILEY,

How To

PROTECT YOURSELF AGAINST COPS IN CALIFORNIA

PLACES 51-52 (1982).
7. The terms i'suspect," "accused," "detainee," and "arrestee" are used interchangeably in this article. "Defendant" is generally used only when a reference
is made by a court; the word technically refers to one who has been formally charged.
"Driving under the influence of alcohol" is hereinafter referred to as "DUIA."
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-76 (1966). An in-custody criminal
defendant must be advised of his right to remain silent, to have counsel present
during questioning, and to have counsel appointed if indigent. He may waive these
rights, but must be informed that any statement made after waiver can be used at trial.
9. See infra note 16 and statutory references therein.
10. No comprehensive empirical study has been done to determine the degree
of reliance on one form of testing over another. However, the unreliability of urine
tests and the practical difficulties involved in taking blood samples have led to overwhelming reliance on the breath analysis or breathalyzer test. See Fitzgerald & Hume,
AND OTHER STRANGE

The Single Chemical Test for Intoxication: A Challenge to Admissibility, in PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES PRACTICE HANDBOOK 70 (MCLE,
Inc. 1982) [hereinafter Single Test]; accord, R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING

(MB) § 25.01 (1977). In view of the extent of police reliance on breathalyzer
testing and the near uniform concentration of judicial dispositions of implied consent challenges on such testing, this article will concentrate on the constitutional implications of the breath analysis testing process.
CASES
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immediately after initial processing or "booking" at the police sta-

tion. Typically, the arresting officer will continue to handle the case.
Short of immediate submission to the test, the accused may seek

some form of help or information prior to making a decision.
Responses might include strict invocation of Miranda rights by refusal

to say or do anything in the absence of counsel; a request for assistance

from the police in making the decision on submission; a request to
talk to a lawyer, the accused's personal attorney, family or friends
prior to proceeding; or a request to have counsel present during the
administration of the BAC test.
Courts have generally refused to sanction any of these responses."

Under a strict application of "implied consent" statutes, the accused
must either submit to testing, expressly refuse, or have delay or silence
construed as a refusal.
Actual or constructive refusal of testing will result in an almost
automatic loss of the driver's license and will leave the police free
to continue to press criminal charges. If the arrestee submits to testing
and the results show a blood alcohol content which is above a
designated percentage by weight, prosecution and conviction are a
virtual certainty.' It is only when the test results are below a statutorily specified level 3 that the accused has a chance of avoiding a drunk

driving prosecution.

11. See Logan v. Shealy, 500 F. Supp. 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 1980) ("No one
has a Constitutional right . .. to have their lawyer present or talk with her on the
telephone in re whether or not she should take the required breathalyzer or blood
test."); State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116, 1120 (Me. 1983) ("[Pjroviding an opportunity for consultation with an attorney is not required by Maine's implied consent
law."); Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. 1975) (no constitutional
right "to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether or not to submit to
breathalyzer test," although statutes of state provide such a right); Finocchairo v.
Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403, cert. denied, 370 U.S.
912 (1962) (because defendant was acquitted, he was not in a position to complain
about refusal of his request to talk with counsel); People v. Sweeney, 55 Misc. 2d
793, 286 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Dist. Ct. 1968); State v. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129, 227 N.W.2d
727 (1975) (Miranda warnings, including right to counsel, are not required when an
arrested driver is asked to submit to a breathalyzer or other test).
12. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.033(a)(4) (Supp. 1982) (person with 0.10%o
or more alcohol by weight in blood or 0.10 grams or more alcohol per 210 liters
of breath presumed under influence of intoxicating liquor); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 32.662(A)(1)(c) (West Supp. 1983) (person with 0.10% or more blood alcohol content by weight presumed under influence of alcoholic beverages); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (person with 0.10% or more alcohol
by weight in blood presumed under influence of intoxicating liquor).
13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.033(a)(2) (Supp. 1982) (person with greater
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B. "IMPLIED CONSENT" LAWS AND RELATED STATUTORY
PROTECTIONS

All fifty states and the District of Columbia have laws making

it a crime to operate a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol
or other controlled substances.' 4 Starting at least as early as 1953,
when New York enacted its "implied consent" statute, 11 state
than 0.05% but less than 0.10% alcohol by weight in blood or greater than 0.05
but less than 0.10 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath not presumed under
influence of intoxicating liquor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.662(A)(1)(a), (b) (West
Supp. 1983) (person with greater than 0.05% but less than 0.10% blood alcohol
content not presumed intoxicated, but blood alcohol percentage usable with other
evidence to determine whether person under influence of alcoholic beverages; if blood
alcohol content 0.05% or less person presumed not under influence of alcoholic
beverages); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(e) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (blood
alcohol percentage of greater than 0.05% and less than 0.10% gives rise to no
presumption; if blood alcohol percentage 0.05% or less, person presumed not
intoxicated).
14. ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(1) (Supp. 1982);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(A) (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2503
(Supp. 1983); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 42-4-1202(1) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227a (West Supp. 1983-1984);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177(a) (Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b) (Supp.
1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193(1) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391
(1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 291-4 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 49-1102 (Supp. 1983);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 11-501 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-2-1 to -2-5 (Burns
Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.281 (West Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-1567 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 189.520 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 (West
Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312-B (Supp. 1983-1984); MD. TRANsP.
CODE ANN. § 21-902 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625 (Supp. 1983-1984); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169.121 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-30 (Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 577.010, .012 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.379 (1983); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:82 (Supp. 1983); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (Supp.
1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1983); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1982);
OKa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-902 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 487.540
(1983); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-1 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-401 (Supp.
1983); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-6-44 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1201 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-266 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.502 (Supp. 1983-1984); W. VA.
CODE § 17C-5-2 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.63 (West Supp. 1983-1984);
WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233 (Supp. 1983).
15. An Act to Amend the Vehicle and Traffic Law, ch. 854, 1953 N.Y. Laws
1876.
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legislatures have enacted laws to condition the privilege of holding
a driver's license on the licensee's consent to a chemical test or analysis
of his breath, blood, or urine if he is arrested on a charge of drunk
driving.1 6 Although there are many variations among the statutes, the
Massachusetts implied consent law"7 is representative of the type of
legislation under consideration in this article. It is particularly appropriate to utilize the statute as prototype legislation in the field since
certain aspects of the law were reviewed in one of the two recent
implied consent cases to reach the United States Supreme Court.' 8
The Massachusetts statute also illustrates the "crack down" approach
which is currently sweeping the country.
The Massachusetts implied consent statute criminalizes the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating li-

16. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (Supp. 1982);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202(3)(a)-(c)
(Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (West Supp. 1983-1984); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 2740 (Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-502 (Supp. 1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 316.1932(1)(a) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-55 (1981);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 286-151 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 49-352 (Supp. 1983); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 95 , § 11-501.1 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4-1 (Burns Supp.
1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.4 (West Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001
(1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 186.565 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West Supp.
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1983-1984); MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 16-205.1 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp.
1983-1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625c (Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.123 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-5 (Supp. 1983); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 577.020(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.383 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 265:84 (Supp. 1983); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (Supp.
1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1983); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1982);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 751 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV,. STAT. § 487.805
(1983); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); R.1. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406
(Supp. 1983); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 67011-5 (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1202 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-268 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308 (Supp. 1983-1984);
W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-4 (Supp. 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West Supp.
1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. § 31-6-102 (1977).
17. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
18. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979); see also South Dakota v. Neville,
103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
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quor or controlled substances. Recent amendments to the statute 19
impose increased penalties for its violation including mandatory prison
terms for repeat offenders,2" prohibitions against placing cases on file
or continuances without a finding, 2 automatic revocation of the
driver's license, 22 and the treatment of death caused by drunk driving
as homicide requiring a minimum mandatory sentence. 23 The "implied consent" component of the statute, chapter 90, section 24(f),
provides: "Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] way
• . .shall be deemed to have consented to submit to a chemical test
or analysis of his breath or blood in the event that he is arrested
for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . ." The police must inform the arrested person that a refusal
to submit to such a test or analysis will result in the suspension of
his "license ... to operate motor vehicles ... in the Commonwealth
... for a period of ninety days." The sanction of automatic loss
of license is designed to serve as a deterrent to drunken driving, a
means of removing such drivers from the highways, and a device for
"obtaining reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent criminal
proceedings." 2 This evidence consists of the results of the breath
analysis or blood tests authorized by the implied consent provisions.
Chapter 90, section 24(e) makes such results admissible and relevant in a DUIA prosecution. Evidence that the percentage, by weight,
of alcohol in the accused's blood, as indicated by the breath analysis
or blood test, was ten one-hundredths or more, creates a presumption that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
for purposes of guilt under the act. 2" However, in Massachusetts,

19. Massachusetts extensively modified its drunk driving laws in August, 1982.
See 1982 Mass. Acts, ch. 373. These modifications resulted from an intensive study
by an Executive Task Force which gathered data on the effects of drunk driving
and examined developments across the county. See ALCOHOL ABUSE, supra note 1.
20. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983-1984)
(minimum sentences range from seven to sixty days in prison).
21. Id.
22. MAsS.

GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(b) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (conviction of violation of (a)(1) revokes license for at least thirty days).
23. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24G(a) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (minimum
sentence of one year for crime of homicide-by-motor vehicle by one operating a
motor vehicle under the influence).

24. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (construing MAss. GEN.

ANN.

ch. 90, § 24(1)(f)).

LAWS

25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (West Supp. 1983-1984). See
Commonwealth v. Moreira, 385 Mass. 792, 797, 434 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1982) (courts
should avoid the term "presumption" and instead use "inference"); see also Com-
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evidence of a person's failure or refusal to consent to a breathalyzer
or blood test is not admissible for this purpose in the trial of a driving under the influence charge.2 6
The statute also delineates the specific procedures the police must
follow when an arrested person refuses to submit to testing. A report
of such refusal must be immediately prepared by the officer witnessing the refusal, and must be signed by a third person witness and
by the local police chief. 2 The report is forwarded to the Registrar
of Motor Vehicles, and, immediately upon receipt, the driver's license
of the accused "shall" be suspended for ninety days.28 Post-suspension
review of license revocation is immediately available before the
Registrar2 9 with an appeal to the Registry Board of Appeal. 3"
Massachusetts law affords two additional statutory rights which
interact with the "implied consent" law. Any person held in custody
on a charge of operating under the influence shall be informed immediately upon being booked "of the right to an independent medical
examination by a physician of his choice" and must be given a
reasonable opportunity to exercise that right. 3 The accused must be
given a copy of this law or the police must post a copy in a conspicuous place in the police station. 2 Finally, any arrested person who
is in custody at a station or place of detention shall be permitted
to use a telephone "to communicate with . . . family or friends, or
to arrange for . . . bail, or to engage the services of an attorney." 33
monwealth v. Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 426, 319 N.E.2d 901, 903 (1974). The constitutional issues raised by presumptions or inferences of intoxication are discussed

in Thompson, The Constitutionality of Chemical Test Presumptions of Intoxication
in Motor Vehicle Statutes, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 301 (1983).
26. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (West Supp. 1983-1984). See
Commonwealth v. Scott, 359 Mass. 407, 269 N.E.2d 454 (1971); cf. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 32-23-10.1 & 19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 103
S. Ct. 916 (1983).
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 24()(g).

30. Id. § 28; see also 540 C.M.R.

REGISTRY OF MOTOR VEHICLES

§ 11.02.

31. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 263, § 5A (West 1970). See Commonwealth
v. Alano, 388 Mass. 871, 448 N.E.2d 1122 (1983).
32. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 33A (West 1972).
33. Id. See Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 567, 387 N.E.2d 527,
535 (1979) (noncompliance with statutory duty is only one factor in determining
whether unfavorable evidence obtained without an opportunity to telephone should
be excluded at trial); Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 503, 287 N.E.2d 599,
603 (1972) (violation of statute occurs only when defendant is intentionally denied
access to a telephone); see also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 610, 321
N.E.2d 822, 829 (1975).
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The police must advise the detainee of this right "forthwith upon
his arrival" at the police station and must permit use of a telephone

"within one hour thereafter." 3"

Provisions of drunk driving laws of other jurisdictions, either
by express terms or through judicial interpretation, vary significantly

from the Massachusetts approach. Some states expressly make a refusal
to consent to testing admissible as evidence of guilt in a subsequent
criminal trial.35 In at least one instance, refusal constitutes a separate
criminal offense.36 In Oregon37 and Alaska 38 an accused is given no

advice on the legal consequences of a decision not to submit to testing
until after an initial refusal to test has been made. A request to con-

sult with counsel or to delay for the purpose of gaining outside advice is generally treated as a binding constructive refusal.39 Some states

At least one court has expressly held that a statutory right to a phone call
does not attach until after sobriety testing has been completed. Copelin v. State,
635 P.2d 492, 493 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983).
A major difference between the statutory right to a phone call and the right
of access proposed in this article is the nature of the opportunity offered. A statutory
duty would appear to be satisfied if the police allow the suspect one chance to make
a single phone call. This article proposes a "reasonable opportunity" to contact counsel
which would include a right of repeated access short of frustration of the basic
evidence-gathering purposes of the implied consent law. See infra text accompanying
notes 137-44.
34. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 33A (West 1972).
35. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(e) (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 29, § 1312(8) (Supp. 1983-1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 32-23-10.1 &
19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1983).
36. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (Supp. 1982) (refusal to submit to BAC testing
is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by a minimum sentence of imprisonment of
not less than 72 consecutive hours; subsequent convictions for this offense carry
sentences of up to 20 days; conviction also carries mandatory enrollment in an alcohol
rehabilitation program).
37. State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 803, 636 P.2d 393, 401 (1981). But see OR.
REV. STAT. § 487.805(1) (1983) (statute subsequently amended to require disclosure
to driver of consequences of test).
38. Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1212 n.15 (Alaska 1983) (citing Wirz v.
State, 577 P.2d 227 (Alaska 1978)) ("The police are not required to inform the arrestee that he has the right to refuse; however, if he does refuse, he must be advised
of the consequences flowing from his refusal and be permitted to reconsider his refusal
in light of that information.")
39. See, e.g., Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); State
v. Braunesreither, 276 N.W.2d 139 (S.D. 1979); State v. Heles, 272 N.W.2d 808
(S.D. 1978); Fgeldsted v. Cox, 611 P.2d 382 (Utah 1980); Brewer v. State Dep't

of Motor Vehicles, 23 Wash. App. 412, 595 P.2d 949 (1978); cf. Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625, 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979).
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specifically preclude consultation with an attorney prior to -testing,4' 0
while others create a right of access by court rule or legislative
provision."' Many states have lengthened the period of automatic
license suspension for refusal to submit to BAC testing and have increased penalties for convictions. 2 One state even provides that failure
of a blood alcohol test is conclusive evidence of guilt in a drunk driving
prosecution."3
These implied consent laws and related statutes apply at a purely
criminal stage of a DUIA case. A civil or administrative license revocation proceeding commences only after an express or implied refusal
to submit to testing. 4 Prior to such refusal, the police are engaged
in a criminal investigation the sole purpose of which is to obtain the
most essential and probative evidence of guilt-the results of a blood
alcohol content test. 5 Thus, a person arrested on a drunk driving
40. E.g., State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116, 1117 (Me. 1983).
41. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(6) (1983) expressly establishes
a right to call counsel prior to testing. See Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 457-60,
259 S.E.2d 544, 547 (1979); see also Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Alaska
1983) (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(b) (1980) and Alaska Criminal Rule
5(b)); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Iowa 1978) (statute required peace officer to "permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place
of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of his or her family or an attorney
of his or her choice"); Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 415,
247 N.W.2d 385, 392 (1976) (statute required officer to "admit any resident attorney
retained by or in behalf of the person restrained, or whom he may desire to consult,
to a private interview at the place of custody"); Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d
861, 865-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (statute and court rules provided the right "to
consult with counsel or other persons in his behalf at all times"); McNulty v. Curry,
42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 346, 328 N.E.2d 798, 802-03 n.3 (1975) (statute required that
"[alfter the arrest, detention, or any other taking into custody of a person . . .
such person shall be permitted forthwith facilities to communicate with an attorney
at law of his choice who is entitled to practice in the courts of this state."); State
v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 441, 610 P.2d 893, 896, vacated and remanded,
449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980) (court rule required
that "[a]t the earliest opportunity a person in custody who desires counsel shall be
provided access to a telephone . . . and any other means necessary to place him

in communication with a lawyer.").
42. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032 (Supp. 1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp. 1983-1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp.
1983-1984); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1982).
43. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a)(2) (Supp. 1982).
44. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1983-1984);
id. §§ 24(1)(g) & 28 (West 1969).
45. A distinction has been drawn between the legal effects of a pre-testing denial
of access to counsel in a subsequent DUIA criminal proceeding and those in a civil/administrative license revocation proceeding. Until recently it has generally been held
that even if some form of right to counsel exists, its denial has no bearing in the
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charge must decide whether to submit to or refuse such a test at a
time when the prosecutorial forces of the state are plainly amassed
against him. This article will describe how, in the present state of
the law, this decision is made without any significant procedural protections beyond those gratuitously afforded by legislative largesse.
Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has held that Miranda
does not apply to police questioning pursuant to implied consent laws."'
Lower courts have also determined that the accused enjoys no fifth"'
or sixth"8 amendment rights to remain silent or be provided legal
counsel; that the administration of BAC tests are permissible searches
under the fourth amendment; 9 and that due process limitations on
police practices cover only deceitful or outrageous conduct.5"
The highly vulnerable position of the accused in the unique circumstances of the implied consent testing choice demands a greater
determination or review of a license revocation based on noncompliance with an
implied consent law. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 1180, 140
N.W.2d 866, 869 (1966); Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11N.Y.2d at 59, 181 N.E.2d at 428,
226 N.Y.S.2d at 403; Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 460, 259 S.E.2d 544, 550
(1979); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 298 (N.D. 1974); Blow v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 631-32, 164 N.W.2d 351, 352 (1969). These cases
are premised on a distinction that confuses the existence of legal rights with the
proper remedy for their violation. As pointed out in Hles v. South Dakota, 530
F. Supp. at 651, the civil and criminal nature of DUIA proceedings are "inextricably
intertwined." The Heles court stated:
To say that the [DUIA-detainee] does not have a right to contact an attorney prior to deciding whether to take the sobriety test, because the license
revocation proceeding, initiated once the test is refused, is civil in nature
totally ignores the fact that the person is in custody pursuant to an arrest
on a criminal charge. The proceedings are all criminal in nature until testing
is actually refused.
Id. at 652.
46. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983). "In the context of an
arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take
a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda ....
The police inquiry . . .is similar to a police request to submit to finger printing

or photography." Id. at 923 n.15.
47. E.g., Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 776, 438 N.E.2d 60, 65
(1982).
48. See, e.g., State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 806, 636 P.2d 393, 403 (1981);
cf. Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646, 652 (D.S.D.), vacated as moot, 682
F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).
49. Newton, 291 Or. at 805, 636 P.2d at 402-03; cf Commonwealth v. Angivoni,
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 555, 417 N.E.2d 422 (1981); see generally Schmerber v. Califor-,
nia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
50. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916, 924 (1983); cf Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (use of stomach pump to retrieve evidence violative
of due process).
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degree of procedural protection than is currently afforded by existing
statutory and case law. This analysis will turn, therefore, to an examination of alternative bases for recognition of a limited right to
consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to testing
under an implied consent law.
III.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE

BAC

TESTING CHOICE:

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
LEGAL ADVICE

The source of a right to consult with counsel has been a matter
of some difficulty for those courts which have addressed the issue.
The right may first be based on an explicit court rule or statute, or
5
inferred from the implied consent statutory scheme. In view of the
51. See, e.g., State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 448, 610 P.2d 893, 897,
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858,
858, 620 P.2d 999, 1000 (1980). The initial decision in Fitzsimmons established a
right of access based on court rules and the sixth amendment. According to these
rules, promulgated by the Washington State Supreme Court, see generally WASH.
REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2.04.18 (West 1981), an accused must be advised of the right

to appointed counsel immediately upon being taken into custody and must "[a]t the
earliest opportunity . . . be provided access to a telephone, the telephone number
of the public defender or official responsible for assigning counsel, and any other
means necessary to place him in communication with a lawyer." WASH. CRIM. R.
2.11(c)(2). Under Rule 2.11, "[tlhe right to counsel shall accrue as soon as feasible
after defendant is taken into custody, . . . when he appears before a ... magistrate,
or . . . when he is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest." Id. at 2.11(b)(1).
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in this case and remanded
for clarification as to whether the decision was "based upon federal or state constitutional grounds or both." Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. at 977.
In response to the Supreme Court's order, the Washington Sujpreme Court held
that "J. Cr. R. 2. 11 provides an independent and adequate state ground" for a right
to contact counsel prior to making the DUIA testing decision, and reaffirmed its
earlier decision. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d at 859, 620 P.2d at 1000. See South
Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26
(1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Murdock v. Memphis, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874); see also Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551
(1940).
A number of courts have adopted this state law approach to the question. See,
e.g., Fuller v. State Dep't of Transp., 275 N.W.2d 410, 411 (Iowa 1979) (state is
required to permit arrested persons, on their request, the right to consult counsel
before deciding whether to submit to a chemical sobriety test pursuant to a statute);
Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 412, 247 N.W.2d 385, 393
(1976) (limited right to counsel based on the implied consent statute itself and general
statutory provisions governing right of access to counsel); Gooch v. Spradling, 523
S.W.2d 861, 865 (Mo. App. 1975) (court rule specifically requires that a person arrested and held in custody shall be permitted to consult with counsel); Seders v.
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clear tendency of state legislatures to tighten drunk driving laws and
to facilitate prosecution thereunder, even a minimal broadening of
the accused's statutory rights seems unlikely. 2 The provisions of state
constitutions form a second basis for a right of access to legal advice. Although these provisions often parallel the terms of the federal
Constitution, judicial recognition of state constitutional rights which
are broader than those established by the Supreme Court under the
United States Constitution offers an important alternative basis for
greater procedural rights at the BAC testing stage. 3 This article will
Powell, 39 N.C. App. 491, 250 S.E.2d 690, aff'd, 298 N.C. 453, 461, 259 S.E.2d
544, 550 (1979) (the motorist does not have a constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel prior to deciding whether to take the test; the right to counsel is purely
statutory); McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 346-47, 328 N.E.2d 798, 802 n.3
(1975) (state statute allows a person to communicate with an attorney following arrest or detention); Narten v. Curry, 33 Ohio Misc. 94, 95-96, 291 N.E.2d 799, 800
(1972) (a person arrested for DUIA is entitled to the right of counsel equally with
those charged with major felonies or other criminal acts).
Clearly, the problems raised in this article concerning the unfairness of implied
consent testing procedures could be easily corrected by adoption of an explicit statutory
right to consult similar to that recognized in Fitzsimmons. See Holmberg v. 54-A
Judicial Dist. Judge, 60 Mich. App. 757, 760, 231 N.W.2d 543, 544 (1975) ("The
mere allowing of a reasonable phone call to counsel prior to administering the test
would be a more commendable practice on the part of the police.") Subsequent
treatment of Fitzsimmons by the Washington lower courts indicates, however, that
even an express statutory right may be very narrowly confined and may, therefore,
fail to provide the type of protection needed by the DUIA detainee. See State ex rel.
Juckett v. Evergreen Dist. Ct., 32 Wash. App. 49, 55, 645 P.2d 734, 737 (1982)
(Fitzsimmons does not require that a DUIA suspect be specially advised of the rights
conferred by WASH. CRIM. R. 2.11(b); the accused must make a timely request to
call counsel before rule applies); accord State v. Wurm, 32 Wash. App. 258, 260,
647 P.2d 508, 510 (1982).
52. State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116, 1120-21 (Me. 1983) ("[W]ith each set of
amendments [to the implied consent and drunk driving statutes] . . . protection [of
the accused] has declined." Id. at 1120 (footnote omitted); mere existence of implied
consent statute does not support inference that legislature "intended to provide access to counsel prior to test." Id. at 1122); cf. Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206,
1215 (Alaska 1983) (state statute conferring right to telephone or otherwise communicate with counsel immediately after arrest requires police to honor reasonable
request by DUIA suspect to contact a lawyer prior to deciding whether to submit
to BAC test).
53. The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the highest
courts of the states are free to independently interpret their state constitutions to
provide broader rights than those established by federal constitutional law. See Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (states may freely impose greater constitutional
restrictions on police activity than those required by federal constitution); Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968) (states may develop own constitutional law
to meet local law enforcement needs); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)
(state constitutions may require stricter standards than federal counterpart). A number
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focus on a third and final source for a right of access to counsel,
the Constitution of the United States. Challenges to implied consent
of commentators, including a United States Supreme Court Justice and two state
supreme court judges, have supported the trend towards greater state constitutional
protections. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (state constitutions are an independent force whose
protections may extend beyond Supreme Court interpretation of federal law); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 1 (1981) (state charters play important role in constitutional process); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State
Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 732 (1982) (state supreme courts may
interpret state constitutions to provide greater protection for individual rights than
the U.S. Constitution); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering The States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 395-96 (1980) (concluding that states need not be
satisfied with minimal federal constitutional law); Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United
States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 887, 925-28 (1980) (reviewing instances
where Massachusetts Constitution grants greater protections than U.S. Constitution);
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW-THE INTERPRETATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,

95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1368-92 (1982) (state courts free to construe state constitutions as granting safeguards beyond those required by U.S. Constitution; criminal
procedure is major area of state constitutional development).
A state court decision based on an independent and adequate state ground is
effectively insulated from review by the United States Supreme Court or the lower
federal courts. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (Supreme Court cannot review state court judgment based on adequate and independent state court
grounds); cf Montana v. Jackson, 103 S. Ct. 1418, 1418 (1983) (remanding case
for clarification of State or federal law basis).
In areas other than constitutional challenges to drunk driving prosecutions, state
courts have generally taken an aggressive approach to the development of expanded
state constitutional rights. See People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 102, 635 P.2d
927, 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 585 (1981) (en banc) (right to counsel under state
constitution extends to pre-indictment lineup despite contrary federal rule); People
v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 52, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1982)
(expressly rejecting Supreme Court rationale and deciding case involving a permissible search and seizure under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
on state constitutional grounds); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Oregon Dep't of
Human Resources, 63 Or. App. 41, 57, 64, 663 P.2d 1247, 1257, 1261 (1983) (Supreme
Court decisions do not foreclose state constitutional evaluation of rule regulating
abortion; although rule valid under federal constitution, it is invalid under state constitution); Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1980) (although federal constitution would require defendant to supply handwriting exemplars, evidence inadmissible under state constitution).
State constitutional challenges to DUIA convictions or license revocation proceedings frequently involve reliance on a state privilege against self-incrimination.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 779, 438 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1982)
(relying on Massachusetts Declaration of Rights); State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 4
(Mont. 1982) (relying on Montana constitution), remanded for clarification, 103 S.
Ct. 1418 (1983); State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 829, 639 P.2d 1320, 1327 (1982)
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procedures or prosecutions based thereon have been variously made
under the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment," the
(en banc) (relying on Washington constitution). State constitutional privileges against
self-incrimination may, by their terms, offer more extensive protection than the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Compare MASS.. CONST., Pt. 1, art.
XII (no person shall "be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself")
and WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 8 ("[nlo person shall betompelled in any criminal
case to give evidence against himself") with U.S. CONsT. amend. V (no person "shall
be compelied in any criminal case to be a witness against himself").
Despite the acknowledged power of state courts to give expansive interpretations to state constitutions, most state courts have adopted the Supreme Court's approach to the privilege against self-incrimination, reasoning that federal and state
provisions are co-extensive, having the same historical genesis, scope and purpose.
See Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 781-82, 438 N.E.2d 60, 67 (1982)
(concluding that state constitution, like federal, permits admission of evidence derived
from field sobriety and breathalyzer tests); State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 111-13,
336 A.2d 244, 246-47 (1975) (because of common history and rationale behind federal
and state privileges against self-incrimination, breathalyzer and field sobriety test results
found admissible); State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 825, 639 P.2d 1320, 1327 (1982)
(although state constitution may grant greater protections than federal, implied consent law is constitutional under both); see also infra notes 205-06, 208, 212 and accompanying text (discussing Schmerber holding that blood alcohol testing evidence
is nontestimonial and admissible under federal constitution). But see State v. Neville,
312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983), aff'd,
346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984)(state constitution provides broader protection against
self-incrimination than federal constitution); State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 4 (Mont.
1982) (admission of defendant's refusal to take breathalyzer test violates state constitution), remandedfor clarificationof basisof decision, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983); Application of Baggett, 531 P.2d 1011, 1021 (Okla. 1974) (refusal to take blood alcohol test
not admissible as evidence under state constitution despite contrary federal view).
United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., has urged that
lawyers recognize the importance of raising state constitutional claims as an explicit
litigation strategy. Brennan, supra, at 502. To the extent that existing principles of
federal constitutional law preclude successful challenges to the BAC testing procedures
attacked by this article as fundamentally unfair, future state court litigation must
increasingly focus on the alternative provisions of state constitutions governing due
process and the right to counsel as the source of greater procedural protections, including a right of access to counsel, for the DUIA accused.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Of the various constitutional bases arguably supporting a right to counsel at
the BAC testing stage, the fourth amendment is by far the least tenable. Before
determining whether access to counsel would be a meaningful protection for fourth
amendment rights, the existence of such rights vel non at the breath analysis stage
must first be established. DUIA defendants have asserted that the testing of a blood
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privilege against self-incrimination protection of the fifth amendment,"
or breath sample without a warrant is an unreasonable seizure of evidence which
must be suppressed at trial pursuant to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., State v.
Newton, 291 Or. 788, 805, 636 P.2d 393, 402-03 (1981); State v. Arsenault, 115
N.H. 109, 110, 336 A.2d 244, 246-47 (1975). See generally Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), effectively disposed of this contention so long as certain specified requirements are satisfied. In Schmerber, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged that the taking of a blood sample without a
warrant implicates the fourth amendment. Id. at 767. The Court held, however, that
the right to be protected in "personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State" was not violated by the forced extraction of a blood sample.
Id. at 770. The Court applied the standard "exigent circumstances" exception to
the general warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. The function of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is to guard against
only those physical intrusions not justified by exigent circumstances or carried out
in a proper manner. Id. at 768.
The only inquiries a court must make are: (1) whether the police had probable
cause to make an arrest for driving while intoxicated and therefore a "clear indication" that a test would uncover evidence of drunkenness; (2) whether the officer
reasonably believed an emergency existed in which the delay necessary to obtain a
search warrant threatened the destruction of evidence; and (3) whether the means
employed to withdraw the blood was reasonable. Id. at 769-71. Answering all queries
in the affirmative, the Court held that the police were justified in extracting blood
from Schmerber without first having obtained a warrant. Id. at 772. See generally
Note, Forcible Administration of Blood Tests: Schmerber v. California, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 680, 689-92 (1967) (discussing Schmerber Court's treatment of fourth amendment issue); Blood-Alcohol Analysis and the Fourth Amendment, 10 SEARCH &
SEIZURE L. REP. 117 (1983) (examining the constitutional and procedural grounds
upon which to base a defense against a DUIA charge).
Lower courts addressing the constitutionality of blood and breath tests have
concentrated on these three Schmerber criteria. See People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591,
594, 428 N.E.2d 852, 853-54, 444 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (1981) (taking of blood sample
does not violate fourth amendment because search not unreasonable given probable
cause, exigent circumstances, and reasonable means); accord State v. Arsenault, 115
N.H. 109, 112, 336 A.2d 244, 246-47 (1975); State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 805,
636 P.2d 393, 402-03 (1981). These cases have uniformly held that given the highly
evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood, the minimal nature of the intrusion into
the body caused by blood, breath, and urine tests, and the usually reasonable belief
that the test would reveal intoxication, blood and breath tests do not violate the
fourth amendment.
The Oregon Supreme Court expressly addressed whether the fourth amendment
affords an individual the right to consult with an attorney prior to being subjected
to a breathalyzer test. In Newton, the court declared that because the police could
lawfully seize a sample of the defendant's breath without regard to issues of consent, the assistance of counsel would have no bearing on the validity of the procedure. 291 Or. at 806, 636 P.2d at 403. Because a reasonable search and seizure
could be compelled, the court held that the fourth amendment provided no basis
for a right to counsel prior to deciding on submission to the breathalyzer test. Id.
55. In pertinent part U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person . . .shall
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the right to counsel provisions of the sixth amendment,56 and the
7
general due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1

The Supreme Court of the United States has never addressed the

specific question whether a person charged with drunk driving has
a constitutional right to speak with a lawyer prior to submitting to
or refusing a BAC test. When the Court has been presented with

constitutional challenges to the operation of implied consent laws or
police practices involved in the gathering of evidence in drunk driving cases, it has declined to broaden the procedural rights of the ac-

cused or to extend to the BAC testing stage constitutional guarantees
applicable to other steps in the criminal process. 5" State and lower

federal courts have generally followed this approach in deciding pro-

cedural issues under implied consent laws by giving a restrictive in-

terpretation to Supreme Court decisions in analogous fourth, fifth,
sixth and fourteenth amendment cases.5 9 In recent years, however,
several courts have taken a contrary position in recognizing a limited
form of constitutionally-based right of access to counsel for the drunk
driver."0 These decisions highlight both the theoretical difficulties and

practical importance of such a right.

A. THE RIGHT TO CONSULT AS AN INCIDENT OF FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment' embodies
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...

."

See South

Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916, 918 (1983); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass.
772, 438 N.E.2d 60 (1982).
56. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to . . .have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." See

Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201
(8th Cir. 1982); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 442, 610 P.2d 893, 897,
vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 859, 620 P.2d 999,
1000 (1980).
57. U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, §1 provides, in part: "[Nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See State v.
Newton, 291 Or. 788, 808, 636 P.2d 393, 405 (1982).
58. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983); Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1 (1979); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1953).
59. See supra note 11 and cases cited therein.
60. See Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), rev'd and remanded
on other grounds, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636
P.2d 393 (1982); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893, vacated
and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980).
61. See supra note 57. Since implied consent laws are enacted solely by state
legislatures, there is no need for this article to discuss restraints imposed on the federal
government by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
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societal notions of fundamental fairness and reasonableness. 2 In comparison to other constitutional provisions considered in this article,
due process standards for determining restrictions on state governmental action pursuant to the clause are relatively flexible. The context in which the clause applies, the particular circumstances of each
case, and a consideration of the governmental interests and individual
rights involved define .the requirements of due process. 3 Establishment of a limited right to contact a lawyer prior to making the
"agonizing choice"" required by implied consent laws is consistent
with the historic purposes of the fourteenth amendment and provides
a very strong basis for future judicial consideration of this issue.
1. Due Process Standards and the Implied Consent BAC Testing
Decision
The great virtue of a fourteenth amendment approach-the
dynamic, flexible and responsive nature of the concept of "due process"-is also a significant disadvantage. As a result of the amorphous character of the concept, judicial consideration of the due
process implications of implied consent laws provides limited guidance
on the proper fourteenth amendment standard to be applied to the
right proposed by this article. This section will describe the primary
fourteenth amendment decisions on issues relating to implied consent
62. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNO, HANDBOOK ON CON425-96, 526-81 (2d ed. 1983) (describing history and purposes of
the fourteenth amendment).
63. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 872 (1983) ("The requirements
imposed by the [Due Process] Clause are, of course, flexible and variable dependent
upon the particular situation being examined."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972)("[DJue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.").
In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court stated:
STITUTIONAL LAW

Due process of law . . . formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid

than envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by
an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.
Id. at 492. The fourteenth amendment prohibits practices which are offensive to "common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right." Id. at 473. The Supreme Court
in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), reiterated that " ' "[D]ue
process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.' It is 'compounded of history, reason,
Id. at 895 (quoting Joint Anti-Facist Comm.
the past course of decisions .......
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
64. Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. 431, 440, 231 N.W.2d,396, 399
(1975).
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laws and will propose an analytical framework for future evaluation
of the due process rights of DUIA suspects.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been
expressly relied on in at least three cases to support a limited right
of access to counsel at the BAC testing stages.of a DUIA prosecu-

tion. In State v. Newton,6" a plurality of the Supreme Court of Oregon
held that the "opportunity of an arrested person to promptly com-

66 included the right of a DUIA defenmunicate beyond confinement '
dant "to call a lawyer before deciding to submit to breathalyzer testing. '"67 This right to communicate with counsel was characterized as

a "significant and substantial liberty '

68

interest within the fourteenth

69
amendment concept of substantive due process. As such, the state,

65. State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393 (1981). In Newton the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and immediately given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Two hours later he was
asked to take a breathalyzer test. He then requested an opportunity to talk to a
lawyer. Despite the availability of a telephone, the officer in charge, quoting a standard Oregon State -Police informational form, informed the accused that he was
" 'not entitled to have an attorney present at this breath test and [that] any request
for delay [would] constitute a refusal' " of the test. 291 Or. at 793, 636 P.2d at
396. Newton submitted to the test. On appeal from the trial court's suppression of
the test results, a plurality of the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the refusal
to permit communication with counsel constituted an unconstitutional constraint on
the accused's liberty in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
66. Newton, 291 Or. at 809, 636 P.2d at 406.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 808, 636 P.2d at 405 n.10. Newton is the only case to invoke substantive rather than procedural due process principles in establishing a right of access.
These two concepts must be distinguished before continuing the analysis.
In the procedural sense, due process refers to the conditions under which the
state may deprive an individual of life, liberty or property. Where such deprivations
may result from governmental action, the state must provide fair procedures supporting the basis for and legality of its action. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332 (1976) ("procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' br 'property' interests"); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (due process imposes a "duty . . . to follow a fair

process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions");
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard."). See generally Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28,

30, 37-57 (1976) (setting forth and critiquing due process standards of Mathews v.
Eldridge); Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 114-25 (1978) (discussing

fairness values that underlie due process).
Substantive due process refers to limitations which extend beyond the methods
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represented by police officers, could not place "purposeless

re-

of governmental action to the substance or content of that action. See, e.g., Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). See generally Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic
Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (discussion of due process in terms
of a court's discretion to protect "fundamental rights" not textually found in
Constitution).
A plausible argument can be made that the right proposed in this article is
supported by fourteenth amendment substantive due process. This species of due
process prohibits state denials of fundamental civil liberties unless there is a compelling governmental interest supporting the denial. In its contemporary form, substantive due process involves judicial enforcement of rights which, although not found
in, any specific textual provision of the Bill of Rights, are deemed to have a "value
so essential to individual liberty in our society" that only the most compelling state
interest will justify their abridgement. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 62, at 457. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938). Professors Nowak, Rotunda, and Young assert that the "[Supreme] Court
has implicity recognized a right to fairness in the criminal process as a fundamental
right although its 'fundamental' nature has not been the subject of a specific decision." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 62, at 460 (footnote omitted). See generally Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right to legal materials
and access to courts); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right to transcript
in misdemeanor appeals); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel
in first appeal).
Thus, under implied consent laws, the proper inquiry in a substantive due process
analysis is whether the fundamental right to basic fairness in criminal proceedings
includes the proposed right of a DUIA suspect to have reasonable access to counsel
at the breathalyzer stage. This, in turn, depends on the suspect's interests at stake
at this point, the effects of a denial of counsel on later stages of a prosecution,
and the state's reasons for refusing to provide access. An analysis of these matters,
see infra notes 119-31 and accompanying text, demonstrates that basic fairness is
seriously jeopardized by a failure to allow an opportunity for some consultation with
counsel at the BAC testing decision stage. Although this does raise substantive due
process objections, the generally disfavored status and highly unstructured nature
of this concept make a traditional procedural due process analysis the preferred
approach to the issue.
State v.Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393 (1981), highlights the difficulties
of a substantive due process approach. As pointed out by Justice Linde in his dissent, id. at 819-24, 636 P.2d at 412-15, the attempt to engraft a right of access
onto an amorphous liberty interest in not being held "incommunicado" ignores the
substantive due process focus of existing Supreme Court case law on the right to
privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception). "Neither [the Supreme Court] nor any
court familiar with federal constitutional law would cite as the source of its 'analysis'
[of the right of access issue in DUIA cases] a quotation from a single justice dissenting from a dismissal of an appeal in a birth control case." Newton, 291 Or. at
824, 636 P.2d at 415 (referring to Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 543 (1961)). Justice Linde correctly pointed out that the liberty interests
of the DUIA suspect are those threatened by potential imprisonment for the com-
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straints" 7 0 on the accused's liberty by either refusing a DUIA suspect's
reasonable and timely request to contact a lawyer or by construing that
7
request as a refusal to submit to testing. '
2
The decisions in Heles v. South Dakota and Hall v. Secretary
mission of a crime. Newton, 291 Or. at 824, 636 P.2d at 415 n.6. Accordingly, constitutional violations, if any, lie in a denial of procedural due process or basic fairness
and should be treated as such. Id. at 825, 636 P.2d at 416.
70. Newton, 291 Or. at 809, 636 P.2d at 406.
71. Id.
72. 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated and remanded, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir.
1982). The precedential value of Heles is undercut by the unusual procedural posture
of the case. The State of South Dakota appealed a district court decision in Heles'
favor. During the pendency of the appeal the original plaintiff, Heles, died. Since
the action was an individual one for declaratory relief only, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case as moot. 682 F.2d at 202. "This is not a class action, nor was there
a prayer for damages. The controversy is wholly personal to plaintiff and cannot
survive him." Id. For these reasons the court vacated the judgment and remanded
with directions to dismiss the complaint. See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1238 (1969) (federal courts must be presented

with justiciable controversy in declaratory judgment proceeding; Constitution prohibits federal courts from deciding moot questions).
Despite the ultimate disposition of the case, the Heles opinion is relied on extensively in this article because of the completeness of its analysis, its precision in
addressing many of the important aspects of a right of access, and the paucity of
judicial treatment of the rights herein proposed.
Heles is one of only two federal court decisions to directly address the issue
of whether DUIA detainees have a constitutional right to consult with counsel prior
to making the BAC testing choice. In Heles, plaintiffs Heles and Braunsreither were
South Dakota citizens whose licenses had been revoked under the South Dakota implied consent law for refusing to take breathalyzer tests. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1983). Heles was arrested for DUIA in 1975 and immediately read the South Dakota "Implied Consent Warning." In response to a request
that he take a breathalyzer test Heles asked the arresting officer for advice, which
was refused. He was then transported to the police station and again asked to submit to testing. When he insisted on calling his lawyer, Heles was read the Miranda
warnings and informed that continued insistence on this right would be construed
as a refusal. One hour after his arrest, Heles succeeded in contacting his lawyer
who advised him to take the test. The police, however, denied Heles' subsequent
request.
Braunsreither's case paralleled that of Heles, with the important difference that
his request to call his lawyer was initially honored by the police. Several unavailing
attempts to contact counsel were made. At this point, one and one-half hours after
the arrest, the police demanded a decision and advised Braunsreither that failure
to give a "yes" or "no" answer would be construed as a refusal. This occurred
despite the defendant's persistence in wanting to talk with his attorney. This constructive refusal to take the test became binding when the defendant shortly thereafter
changed his mind, sought to take the test, and was denied a second chance by the
police.
Both defendants appealed the revocation of their licenses. The Supreme Court
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of State73 premise a right of access to counsel on traditional principles of procedural due process. Both cases held that, in view of
the far-reaching legal consequences of the BAC testing decision, it
was fundamentally unfair to refuse a suspect's request to consult with
counsel prior to compelling the testing choice imposed by implied consent laws.74
of South Dakota held that neither arrested driver had a " 'legal or constitutional
right to consult counsel before deciding [to take a'breathalyzer test], and that a request to delay the test for that purpose is . . . a refusal.' " Heles, 272 N.W.2d
808, 810 (S.D. 1978) (quoting Peterson v. State, 261 N.W.2d 405, 410 (S.D. 1977)).
In the § 1983 federal court suit which then followed, it was found that the
denial of a reasonable request to attempt to obtain legal advice was "inconsistent
with the due process demands of both -the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Heles,
530 F. Supp. at 652. Senior District Court Judge Nichol recognized a limited right
to consult at the pre-testing stage as a basic "matter of fairness." Id. at 653.
The other federal suit to directly address the right to counsel of DUIA detainees is Logan v. Shealy, 500 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982). In
this case it was held that a DUIA arrest was not a judicial proceeding for purposes of the sixth amendment, and thus a DUIA detainee had no right to consult with
counsel prior to his decision to submit to or refuse BAC testing.
73. 60 Mich. App. 431, 231 N.W.2d 396 (1975). In Hall, the accused's license
was revoked when he refused to submit to breathalyzer testing. Unlike most of the
cases in this area, Hall was given no Miranda warnings after his arrest. He was
simply denied access to a telephone for any purpose for a period of seven hours.
This denial followed a request to the officer in charge to be permitted to make a
call to the suspect's lawyer to obtain his opinion prior to submitting to a breathalyzer
test. The suspect had expressly agreed to take the test before asking for the opportunity to call. A division of the Michigan Court of Appeals ordered the reinstatement of Hall's driver's license based on a finding that due process had been denied
by the unreasonableness of the police officer's conduct in the case.
See also Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d
403, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962). Judge Van Voorhis concurred in a memorandum order dismissing an appeal from a license revocation for refusal to submit to
a blood test on the apparent grounds that any denial of constitutional rights to due
process had no bearing on a civil revocation proceeding. The judge noted that a
due process right to counsel would require reversal of any criminal prosecution stemming from a refusal to test. Id. at 61, 181 N.E.2d at 428-30, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
He acknowledged that the attempt to contact counsel occurred during a criminal
prosecution since the "respondent [was] . . . arrested on a criminal charge." Id. at
60, 181 N.E.2d at 429, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 405. "[Flairness of procedure in a criminal
prosecution under the concept of due process of law does require . . . that suitable
opportunity to consult with counsel be granted." Id. at 61, 181 N.E.2d at 429, 226
N.Y.S.2d at 405.
74. The Heles court stated:
To demand that a licensed driver be subjected to a choice involving important interests [loss of driving privileges, possible criminal penalties], and
possibly an intrusion into his or her body, to establish evidence of guilt,
without first allowing the person to contact an attorney, would be inconsis-
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The United States Supreme Court's recent disposition of two cases
involving constitutional challenges to implied cosent laws, although

not directly deciding whether there is a due process right to consult
counsel, shed light on the controlling due process principles and the

viability of a constitutionally-based right of access. In South Dakota

v. Neville" the Court found no violation of "fundamental fairness"

in the failure of police to expressly warn a DUIA suspect that his
refusal to submit to BAC testing could be admitted as evidence of
tent with the due process demands of both the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652.
In Hall, the court noted that "[tihe Breathalyzer test itself has apparent and
serious consequences both civilly and criminally." 60 Mich. App. at 436-37, 231
N.W.2d at 397. It emphasized that it was suggesting
a reasonable due process approach to a certain set of circumstances. ....
Plaintiff argues strongly that fundamental fairness and the statutory language
[MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625f(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983) providing for
a hearing to determine "[wlhether the [DUIA suspect] reasonably refused
to submit to the test"] require that the tactical choice allowed be knowingly
made.
60 Mich. App. at 440, 231 N.W.2d at 399.
Even though these cases were appeals from civil license revocation proceedings,
both reviewing courts properly evaluated due process requirements in terms of the
unique character of the proceedings at the pre-testing implied consent stage. Heles,
530 F. Supp. at 651-52; Hall, 60 Mich. App. at 437-38, 231 N.W.2d at 399.
75. 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983). Neville arose under another provision of the South
Dakota implied consent law attacked in Heles. Neville, who refused a blood alcohol
test after receiving Miranda warnings and an additional warning that refusal to take
the test would lead to the loss of his license, challenged a provision of the law
specifically declaring that such refusal was admissible in evidence in the trial of a
driving under the influence case. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10.1 (Supp.
1983). The state supreme court suppressed the refusal evidence. Neville v. State, 312
N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981). The Supreme Court reversed, finding that admission of
such evidence of refusal did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 103 S. Ct. at 917.
The Court also held that no violation of due process had occurred in the failure
of the police to expressly warn the defendant that evidence of refusal could be used
against him at a later criminal trial. Justice O'Connor's abbreviated discussion of
this aspect of the case emphasized that the warnings that were given the accused
contained no misleading implicit assurances that no consequences other than those
specified would result from a refusal. In the absence of any unfair "trick" in the
police handling of the implied consent stage, the failure to warn "comported with
the fundamental fairness required by Due Process." Id. at 923-24.
On remand, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that although there had
not been compelled self-incrimination so as to violate the state constitutional provisions, Neville's due process rights had been violated by the failure of the officer
to warn Neville of the consequences of a refusal. The trial court's suppression of
the refusal was affirmed. 346 N.W. 2d 425, 430-31 (S.D. 1984).
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guilt in the subsequent trial of a DUIA charge. 76 Mackey v. Montrym"
upheld the provisions of a Massachusetts law which limited review
of the propriety of police practices surrounding a refusal to submit
to BAC testing and the consequent automatic loss of a driver's license

to a post-suspension hearing. The Court found that this form of hearing satisfied the fairness requirements of due process in that it entailed no substantial risk of erroneous denial of driving privileges"8
and reflected the state's paramount interest in enforcing drunk driving legislation." 9

These cases make it clear that the first requirement for imposition of fourteenth amendment due process limitations, the presence
of protectable "liberty" or "property" interests which may be lost
as a result of governmental proceedings, is satisfied in the implied
consent context. 0 Implied consent laws compel a decision which may
either further a criminal prosecution, lead to immediate loss of driving privileges, or both. The possibility of imprisonment, loss of license

or fines' which is inherent in the testing process is unquestionably

sufficient to trigger some form of due process protection. The more
difficult issue is the delineation of a standard for measuring the type
of "process" that is "due" the DUIA subject.

One significant problem in stating a standard is the fact that implied consent laws in drunk driving prosecutions can lead to criminal
and civil consequences. These prosecutions involve a continuum of

proceedings ranging from the purely criminal stages of post-arrest in-

vestigation, evidence gathering, charging and trial, to the purely civil/
administrative process of license revocation. Development of an effective due process standard for measuring the procedural rights of
the DUIA suspect within this system is complicated by the interrelationship between the BAC testing decision stage and other phases of the

76. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923-24.
77. 443 U.S. 1 (1979). In Mackey, Montrym's license was revoked after
he
refused to take a breath analysis test. The Court rejected his due process
attack
on statutory suspension procedures which failed to provide a presuspension
hearing
at which a driver could challenge police compliance with the implied consent
law
or raise issues regarding the propriety of a refusal to test. See MAss.
GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f), (g) (West Supp. 1983-1984); see also
Heddan v. Dirkswager,
336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983) (Mackey applied to uphold Minnesota statute
providing
for automatic revocation of license of driver who "fails" breathalyzer
test).
78. Mackey,443 U.S. at 17.
79. Id. at 17-19.
80. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971);
cf. Hewitt
v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 869 (1983); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 758-61
(1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25, 27-28
(1981).
81. See supra notes 20-23, 36.
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continuum that serve a combination of civil and criminal purposes.
This civil/criminal dichotomy of DUIA proceedings has had a
direct bearing on judicial treatment of claims to a right of access
to counsel. The fortuitous circumstance of whether the access claim
is asserted in the trial or appeal of the DUIA criminal charge, or
is raised in a challenge to the administrative suspension of driving
privileges, has at times had a controlling effect on a court's willingness
to find a violation of due process in police denials of access to
counsel.82
A number of courts have seized on the civil/criminal distinction
in rejecting the argument that because the police failed to honor a
request by the accused to contact counsel, the administrative suspension or revocation of a driver's license for refusal to test should be
reversed. 83 These decisions treat violations, if any, of the procedural
rights of a DUIA suspect at the criminal stage as having no legal
effect on subsequent civil proceedings."' These jurisdictions disregard
the criminal overtones of the BAC testing stage in characterizing the
process leading to license revocation as administrative and therefore
5
requiring only minimal procedural protections.
This formalistic view of the implied consent testing process
seriously understates the need for due process safeguards and confuses the search for a workable due process standard. Heles v. South
Dakota8 6 provides a methodology for avoiding this confusion.
Heles characterized the criminal and civil proceedings of drunk
driving prosecutions as being so "inextricably intertwined" that any
'8 7
meaningful distinction between the two was inevitably "blurred."
The court's solution was to measure the rights of the DUIA suspect
82. See Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 651 (noting that jurisdictions which hold that
DUIA arrestee has no right to consult counsel prior to making BAC testing choice
have done so based on a "clear demarcation" between civil and criminal proceedings,
and opining that the civil/criminal distinction is actually very blurred). See generally
Comment, Constitutional Issues Raised by the Civil-Criminal Dichotomy of the Maine

DUI Law, 35 ME. L. REv. 385, 392-94 (1983) (discussing significance of civil/criminal
distinction in state operating-under-the-influence law).
83. See, e.g., Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 58, 181 N.E.2d 426, 428-29,
226 N.Y.S.2d 403, 403, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962); Seders v. Powell, 298
N.C. 453, 462-63, 259 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1979); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291,
298 (N.D. 1974); Blow v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 631, 164
N.W.2d 351, 353 (1969).
84. See supra note 83 and cases cited therein; see also State v. Severino, 56
Hawaii 378, 537 P.2d 1187 (1975); Wolf v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 27 Wash.
App. 214, 626 P.2d 688 (1980).
85. See supra note 83.

86. 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated and remanded, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir.
1982).
87. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 651.
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in light of the fact that "[t]he proceedings are all criminal in nature
until testing is actually refused." 8 Judge Nichol held that the basic
requirements of criminal due process necessitated an opportunity to
contact counsel prior to making the BAC testing decision. s9
For purposes of a due process formula, Heles may go too far
in failing to emphasize the uniquely interdependent nature of the
criminal and civil components of drunk driving prosecutions.
Realistically, when the police inform the suspect that automatic loss
of license will follow a refusal to test, the essentially criminal character
of the proceeding is modified to include features of a civil or administrative undertaking. As the criminal investigation continues, a
refusal to test merely triggers a parallel civil process limited to revocation of driving privileges. The criminal case can still be pursued. A
due process standard should reflect both aspects of the BAC testing
process.
The overlapping, interrelated criminal and civil functions of DUIA
prosecutions give rise to the need for a synthesized due process formula. Such a formula may be constructed from a merger of the
generalized elements of procedural due process required in the criminal
context with a modified statement of the balancing-of-interests approach utilized in administrative proceedings pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge.9"
The suggested synthesized standard would operate as follows: if
a proposed procedural right has a demonstrable beneficial effect in
safeguarding important interests of the criminally accused, its denial
is fundamentally unfair unless it directly thwarts an overriding interest of the state or is plainly administratively overburdensome. The
components of this standard must now be separately analyzed.
The general right to fourteenth amendment due process in criminal
cases includes both the specific procedural safeguards contained in
the Bill of Rights and applied to the states by "incorporation,"'"9 and
88. Id. at 652.

89. Id. at 658.
90. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
91. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1963) (right of
an indigent to counsel in a criminal proceeding considered a fundamental right under
the fourteenth amendment and must be safeguarded in federal and state proceedings);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961) (fourth amendment guarantee of protection against illegal search and seizures and convictions based on such inadmissible
evidence are enforceable against the states); cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
326-28 (1937) (fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy in retrials at the
federal level not obligatory on states).
The term "incorporation" refers to the process by which the United States
Supreme Court has utilized the general provisions of the due process clause of the

[1984:203]

RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL

an independent set of procedural protections fashioned from the fourteenth amendment's broad requirement of fundamental fairness.92 This
fourteenth amendment to make selected procedural protections afforded by the Bill
.of Rights applicable to the states. With the exceptions of the fifth amendment requirement of grand jury indictment, Hurtago v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884),
and the seventh amendment right to jury trial, Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), the first eight amendments to the Constitution have
been found to contain rights which are considered to be "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" and "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be fundamental," that they must be considered applicable to both the state
and federal governments. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. See supra note 69 analyzing substantive due process.
92. An independently functioning concept of "pure" or generalized due process is essential to adoption of the right proposed by this article. Professors Nowak,
Rotunda and Young have observed that "[tihe adjudicative process . . . is governed

by the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights and an independent concept of fundamental fairness which is imposed by the due process clause." J. NowAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNrG, supra note 62, at 534. "Additionally, [to the specific
guarantees of the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments] due process requires
that all procedures be fundamentally fair. The [state] process must always conform
to the twin guarantees of an impartial determination of guilt or innocence and respect
for the dignity of the individual." Id. at 563 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
Decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the areas of right to counsel and
pre-conviction/post-conviction remedies illustrate these points.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), is an early example of a pure due process
analysis. The issue in Betts was whether a per se right to counsel should be established for all state criminal defendants. The Court refused to extend sixth amendment protection to these defendants and chose instead to measure the rights of these
defendants under a fundamental fairness test, which asked whether trial without
counsel in a particular case would be "offensive to the common and fundamental
ideas of fairness and right" embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 473.
Although the result for the specific defendant in Betts was that his trial was not
"lacking in . . . fundamental fairness," a generalized due process approach was

firmly established. Id.
Betts was overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Although
Justice Black thoroughly reviewed the fundamental fairness analysis of the Betts Court
in his majority opinion, the ultimate conclusion that all state criminal defendants
are entitled to counsel at trial was based on an application of the sixth amendment
to the states by "incorporation" through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 342. Justice
Clark concurred in the result, but indicated that he perceived the question before
the Court as one of fourteenth amendment fundamental fairness. Id. at 349 (Clark,
J., concurring in result). Justice Clark asserted that if the Constitution requires a
right to counsel in certain cases, it is unfair to vary this right depending on the
sanction the defendant faces.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), a companion case to Gideon,
the Court considered the related question of whether indigent criminal defendants
had a right to counsel on appeals of right. In extending the Gideon decision to such
appeals, the Douglas Court applied a fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis:
"[t]here is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the
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latter form of due process has often been applied, as in Mackey, to
rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel] . . . while the
indigent [man] ...is forced to shift for himself." Id. at 357-58. Although Douglas,
like Gideon, did have the flavor of a fundamental fairness decision, it was not a
pure due process case.
Any uncertainty about the continued vitality of this form of due process was
resolved in two more recent decisions. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 779-81
(1973), the Court considered the propriety of the revocation of Scarpelli's probation
without a hearing after he committed a burglary during his probation period. The
Gagnon Court found that due process principles required that the revocation be reconsidered, and said that for future cases "the decision as to the need for counsel must
be made on a case-by-case basis .... [Tihere will be certain cases in which fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." Id. at 790.
In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court considered whether inmates
had a right to counsel for discretionary appeals, a question left open in Douglas.
In holding that the due process clause did not require the appointment of counsel
for such appeals, the Ross Court summarized the due process rationale behind cases
since Douglas. Id. at 610-12. Writing for the Ross majority, Justice Rehnquist summarized the rule thusly:
[Tihe precise rationale . . [for these cases] . . . has never been explicitly
stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that
Amendment. Neither Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis
for the result reached, each depending on a different inquiry which emphasizes different factors. "Due Process" emphasizes fairness between the
State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how individuals
in the same situation may be treated.
Id. at 608-09 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has also used a pure due process approach to test the fundamental fairness of state practices before and after the conviction of criminal defendants. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 613, 614 n.5 (1975), the prosecution attempted to use the post-Miranda warning silence of the defendant, Doyle, to impeach
him when he testified at trial. The Doyle Court held that this practice violated the
due process clause, stating that, because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure defendants that their silence will not be used against them, "it would be fundamentally
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to
be used to impeach." Id. at 618.
Criminal defendants have tried to extend Doyle in a number of contexts with
varying success. In Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980) (per curiam),
the Court explained why the use of silence for impeachment in Doyle was fundamentally unfair. "Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and
assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him . . ..
Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt
of government assurances." The Court elaborated on this summation of Doyle in
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam), when it stated that, in the
absence of Miranda warnings, "we do not believe that it violates due process of
law for a State to permit cross-examination as to arrest silence when a defendant
chooses to take the stand." The Court then held that the state may determine the
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civil or quasi-criminal proceedings. 9 3 South Dakota v. Neville, in ex-

amining the fairness of not warning a DUIA suspect of certain consequences of a refusal to submit to testing, is a reminder that the
procedural rights of the criminally accused must conform to the general
fairness strictures of the fourteenth amendment.9 4 The problem with

due process as an independent source of procedural rights defined
in terms of "fundamental fairness" is the lack of meaningful content
to any standard based thereon. 9 A modified statement of the Mathews
v. Eldridge96 test provides such content and is a viable standard for
determining whether procedures which compel a decision on BAC

testing and related matters without the guidance of counsel violate
the fourteenth amendment's requirement of basic fairness.
extent to which post-arrest silence may be used to impeach a defendant when no
Miranda warnings are given.
Finally, in Bearden v. Georgia, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 2067 (1983), the Supreme Court
used a due process/fundamental fairness analysis in a post-conviction context. In
Bearden, the defendant had been placed on probation and required to pay restitution. He had his probation revoked and was sentenced to prison when he was laid
off from his job, failed to obtain substitute employment, and was unable to pay
his restitutionary obligation. Id. at 2067-68. The Bearden Court overturned the revocation of the defendant's probation, holding that to deprive Bearden of his freedom
for his inability to pay a fine would be "contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2073.
Taken together these cases indicate that the due process clause alone can provide a substantive standard for judicial review of criminal practices. While the precise
nature of this pure due process analysis is ethereal in that the conception of what
is fundamental and fair may vary according to the vicissitudes of Court composition
and the facts of each case, the decisions do illustrate that when the Court chooses
to do so, it can use the due process clause to strike down superficially adequate
state practices that fail to meet a constitutional standard of fundamental fairness.
93. Mackey, 443 U.S. 1 (1979). See supra note 77; see also Hewitt v. Helms,
103 S. Ct. 864, 868-69 (1983) (right to adversary hearing prior to removal of prisoners
from general prison population to segregated unit); Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (right to counsel at hearing to terminate parental rights).
94. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923-24.
95. See supra notes 63, 69; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24, stating that due
process "expresses the requirement of 'fundamental fairness', a requirement whose
meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause
is ... an uncertain enterprise. .. ."
96. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, Eldridge challenged Social Security Administration procedures for termination of benefits under the Social Security Act.
The specific issue was whether an evidentiary hearing was required prior to termination of such benefits. The Supreme Court held that due process was provided where
the recipient had an effective process for contesting the denial of benefits prior to
administrative action and was afforded a hearing and judicial review prior to finalization of denial of benefits. Id. at 332-49; see also Mashaw, supra note 69.
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The Mathews due process standard for civil proceedings requires
a balancing-of-interests test. 97 These interests include the private interests at stake in a state proceeding;98 the risk that these interests
may be improperly lost under existing procedures and the likelihood

of removing this risk through changes in such procedures;99 and any
overriding governmental interests which would justify rejecting a proposed procedure modification.' 0 An extension of this approach to
the general area of criminal due process requires merely a specification of these private interests in terms of the individual values af-

fected by the hybrid DUIA prosecution.' 0 1 That is, Mathews need
only be redefined to factor in the full range of criminal and civil
consequences that flow from events occurring at the BAC testing stage.
The modified Mathews test would consider, therefore, the DUIA
suspect's interest in avoiding unfair imposition of criminal and civil

penalties in a DUIA prosecution; the value of a right of access in
minimizing such unfairness; and the reasons profferred by the state

97. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Mathews measures the fairness of a state procedure by considering three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by

. . .

official action; sec-

ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value .

Id.

.

. of additional or substitute pro-

cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. See generally Clark, Ingraham v. Wright and the Decline of Due Process, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1151 (1978) (describing withdrawal of Supreme Court

from due process intervention except in incorporation and privacy areas as part of
return to federalism principles).

101. Nowak, Forward-Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation
World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (1980). Professor Nowak has offered

an expanded and refined statement of Mathews in the form of a four stage analysis:
First, the Court should . . . identify the values that are involved in the
case ....
Second, the Court should determine the importance of the values

endangered by the state's [procedural] practice. The opinion should inquire
into . . . the nature of the values reflected in . . . general principles of

due process, i.e., protection of individual dignity, equality of treatment,
and traditional conceptions of fairness. Third, the Court should examine
the impact of a ruling

. . .

on the reliability of the guilt-determination pro-

cess, and it should evaluate the cost of administering a system with the
procedural safeguard . . . sought by the defendant ....
Fourth, the Court
should determine whether the due process . . . values outweigh the social

costs of a ruling adverse to the state.
Id. at 401-02 (footnote omitted).
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for denying reasonable access. This "model" of due process
methodology has the virtue of interjecting an explicit value preference
for fundamental fairness into the process of balancing individual rights
and state interests established by Mathews. Its application to the mixed
criminal and civil aspects of DUIA prosecutions provides a workable
due process structure for evaluating the proposed limited right of access to counsel at the BAC testing stage.
This article takes the position that the events surrounding the
BAC testing decision (the factual background of the case, the decision itself, the test administration, if any, and the uses to which the
results may be put) determine such a range of adverse legal consequences, including the possible criminal guilt or innocence of the DUIA
defendant, that the denial of an opportunity to obtain legal advice
at this stage constitutes a denial of fourteenth amendment due process under this standard. Recognition of a limited right of access will
neither interfere with the state's legitimate interest in enforcing drunk
driving and implied consent laws nor impose unrealistic administrative
burdens on law enforcement personnel. The proposed right is limited
to reasonable access after which a testing decision must be made.
Reasonable access is practically feasible. Listings of attorneys willing
to be contacted, Bar Association programs, or student-organized advisory systems could easily provide the type of access to legal advice
contemplated by this proposal.' 2
2. Fundamental Fairness, the Decision to Submit to Testing,
and the Need for a Constitutionally-Based Right to Consult with
Counsel
The modified Mathews v. Eldridge standard for measuring the
fundamental fairness of implied consent procedures at the BAC testing
stage requires, essentially, consideration of the values attaching to the
competing interests of the DUIA suspect and the state, the importance of availability of access to legal advice to the accuracy and
102. See, e.g., State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893, vacated
and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 858-59, 620 P.2d 999, 1000
(1980).
[A]s a practical matter the requirements [of a right of access] . . . appear
to be already met in some counties in the state. In at least three counties
... 24 hour access to appointed counsel by telephone is provided ....
In the state's less populated counties a list of attorneys who have expressed
a willingness to serve as appointed counsel for indigents could easily be
supplied to the defendant by the arresting and charging officer ....
93 Wash. 2d at 446, 610 P.2d at 899 n.l.
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fairness of the decision-making processes, and the practicability of
imposing a specific duty on the state to allow a reasonable opportunity for a DUIA suspect to contact counsel. 03 Application of this
standard to the breathalyzer decision suggests that a right of access
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment should
be established for the following reasons. First, at the BAC testing
decision stage of a criminal drunk driving prosecution, the DUIAaccused is in such a vulnerable and adversarial position that prejudice
to or loss of important legal rights is highly likely without access to
legal advice. Second, existing statutory rights provide inadequate protection against such losses. Third, a right of access to counsel, limited
by practical considerations, will meaningfully reduce the risk of prejudice or lost rights without compromising the state's ability to effectively prosecute drunk driving cases. These three factors will be
subjected to a due process analysis in the following description of the dangers created by the circumstances surrounding the BAC
testing decision and the realities of drunk driver prosecutions.
(a) Vulnerability of the DUIA Suspect
The vulnerability of the DUIA suspect arises initially from the
very limited statutory rights present at the BAC testing stage. In the
majority of jurisdictions, the accused must be given the Miranda warnings some time after arrest and, at the station house, must be informed that he has a right to refuse a blood alcohol test. He must
also normally be told that refusal to submit will lead to automatic
loss of his license and that there is a right to independent medical
testing at his own expense. Finally, the suspect must generally be informed that at some point he has a right to make a phone call. I0,
In contrast to this summary information, the accused lacks
awareness of a number of matters' that may profoundly affect subsequent proceedings (civil or criminal) and, in particular, may lead to
the providing of highly incriminating, if not conclusive, evidence of
intoxication, the essential element of a DUIA criminal offense.'0 6 In
this context, the failure to supply either crucial information on the
major consequences of the BAC testing choice, or reasonable access
to such information, offends "traditional notions of fair play and
103. See supra notes 97, 101 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 8, 14-43 and accompanying text.
105. Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1213 n.17 (Alaska 1983), contains an extensive list of the consequences of the BAC testing decision.
106. See, e.g., Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652.
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substantial justice."10 7
One category of this type of information involves the additional
legal consequences of a testing refusal other than loss of license.' 8
The decision is now made without any awareness on the part of the
accused that he or she may be criminally prosecuted regardless of
submission to the test. A refusal may only mean that the accused
will suffer both automatic loss of license and the additional penalties
imposed upon conviction on drunk driving charges.' 9 The refusal to
submit to testing may also be admissible as evidence of guilt in any
subsequent criminal trial."0I In states following this practice, the government has an overwhelming advantage either way. If the accused submits and fails the test, there is powerful evidence of guilt; if the accused does not submit to testing, the jury may, and most likely will,
infer consciousness of guilt from this refusal, thereby substantially
strengthening the state's case. Finally, failure to submit to testing may
constitute a criminal offense separate from a DUIA charge."' In this
instance, actual or constructive refusal will cause the accused to unwittingly plead guilty to a crime.
Despite this lack of certain types of specific information, the
DUIA-accused certainly does have at least some understanding of the
effects of a decision not to submit. With regard to the consequences
of submission there exists a second, qualitatively different, category
of information lacking at the pre-testing stage which compounds the
unfairness of the system. The accused has absolutely no awareness
that submission to and failure of the test makes a driving-under-theinfluence conviction a virtual certainty. If test failure (a designated
percentage of alcohol in the blood by weight) is conclusive evidence
of guilt, the test is, for all practical purposes, the defendant's only
trial. Treating the test results as merely presumptive evidence of guilt
will often have the same effect."' The accused should at least have
an opportunity to weigh the possibility of a conviction and criminal
107. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ("traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" implicit in due process).
108. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (enumerating jurisdictions
where refusal to submit to BAC testing is admissible as evidence in DUIA prosecution and where refusal to submit constitutes a separate criminal offense).

109. See, e.g.,

MAss.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 90, § 24(l)(a)(1), (b) (West Supp.

1983-1984).
110. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983); see also textual discussion
supra at 51-71 and accompanying notes.
111. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (refusal to submit is Class A misdemeanor) & § 28.35.030(a)(1) (crime of driving while intoxicated) (Supp. 1982).
112. See supra notes 12-13.
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record if the test is failed against the certain loss of driver's license
and the real threat of criminal prosecution if the test is refused.
Similarly, there is currently no awareness that an accused who suc-

cessfully "passes" the blood alcohol test may still be criminally pro-

secuted if, for example, the police feel the driver was especially susceptible to the effects of alcohol and therefore not in a condition to
drive. II3
Another problem involves the current emphasis of the required
advice on automatic loss of license for refusal. The accused may

mistakenly believe that submission will avoid such loss when in fact

loss of license is uniformly included as a sanction for a DUIA con-

viction, and may in some circumstances be mandatory.' 4l

A far greater difficulty is raised by the near hysterical public at-

titude toward drunk drivers and the resultant pressures placed on the
police, prosecution and judges to "crack down" in DUIA cases." 5
Rarely does the accused facing the breathalyzer choice have a meaningful understanding of the scope of criminal liability to which he
113. The crime at issue is driving "under the influence of intoxicating liquor."
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (emphasis added). The standards for intoxication contained in implied consent laws, which
make certain blood alcohol content readings evidence of intoxication, are generally
nonconclusive guidelines for the police and juries. These laws plainly permit prosecutions to be brought against any driver, who, under the facts and circumstances
of an individual case, is impaired in his or her driving capabilities as a result of
the consumption of alcohol. "Failure" of a BAC test is only one indicator of such
impairment.
114. See supra notes 16, 22 and accompanying text.
115. This article is premised on the view that drunk driving is a tragic and unnecessary social problem. The author makes no suggestion that it is inappropriate
for the public to demand that lawmakers, police and the courts take all possible
measures to eradicate this problem. National organizations such as MADD (Mothers
Against Drunk Drivers) or SADD (Students Against Driving Drunk) can and should
put pressure on the criminal justice system to respond to such demands. It is equally
appropriate, however, to note that some forms of solution to the problem may simply
go too far in the invasion of individual rights. The recent practice of instituting
random road blocks at which drivers are stopped without regard to probable cause,
and the ensuing litigation over the legality of this procedure, illustrates the danger
of overreaction by the police in responding to public pressures to "get tough" on
drunk drivers. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of State, 136 Ariz.
1, 7, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983) (roadblock search for drunk drivers unconstitutional
because unduly intrusive upon individual rights); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan,
389 Mass. 137, 144-45, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983) (police roadblock search for drunk
drivers unconstitutional because state failed to establish adequate police presence,
lighting and warning to motorists); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D.
1976) (absent judicial warrant, roadblock stops of motorists to search for liquor law
violations unconstitutional).
See, e.g., MAss. GEN.
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is exposed through submission to testing. Historically, the popular
view was that it was more desirable to risk conviction by taking the

test rather than suffer immediate loss of license." 6 The severity of

recently heightened penalties for DUIA violations, especially for repeat
offenders, calls this strategy into question and makes the testing choice
vastly more significant." 7 By raising the stakes at the testing stage,
legislatures may have correspondingly increased the need for procedural

protections for the accused.

Lastly, for other suspects, particularly first-time offenders, one
of the positive components of new drunk driving legislation is the
116. The rationale for this approach centered on the options left open after
testing. A DUIA defendant might enter a nolo contendre plea or have the case placed
"on file" (no formal finding of guilt, but accused subject to conditions, such as
counseling, for a specified period after which all criminal charges would be dismissed)
and, by so doing, avoid entry of a criminal conviction or any form of criminal penalty
while still retaining driving privileges. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90,
§ 24(1)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983-1984), which provides that any "prosecution commenced under this paragraph [punishing repeat offenders] may not be placed on file
or continued without a finding."
117. There are numerous difficulties in the "take-the-test" strategy. In a state
like Minnesota, which imposes automatic loss of license for either refusal to submit
to, or failure, of the BAC test, the chance of retaining driving privileges is significantly
reduced by taking a BAC test. See Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 59-63
(Minn. 1983) (state prehearing license revocation statute not violative of due process); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123(4) (West Supp. 1984) (person stopped for probable cause who refuses BAC testing has license revoked for six months; persons
stopped for probable cause whose BAC tests indicate alcoholic concentration of .10%
or more has license revoked for 90 days).
Repeat DUIA offenses, if convicted, face mandatory imprisonment and loss of
license in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-692.01(E)-(F)
(Supp. 1983-1984) (person convicted of DUIA within 60 months of first offense must
serve 60 days in jail and has driving privileges revoked; person convicted of DUIA
three times in space of 60 months must serve at least six months in prison and has
license revoked for three-year period); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 265.82-b(I) (1983)
(person convicted of DUIA within seven years of first offense must serve a week
in jail and has license revoked for three years; person convicted of DUIA more than
twice within seven years must serve jail term and has license revoked indefinitely);
VA. CODE § 18.2-270 (Supp. 1983) (person convicted of DUIA three times within
five years must serve at least one month in jail).
The evidentiary weight that some jurisdictions give unsatisfactory BAC test results
further militates against a decision to submit. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.033(a)(4)
(Supp. 1982) (person with 0.10% or more blood alcohol by weight or 0.10 grams
of alcohol per 210 liters of breath presumed intoxicated); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-227a(c)(3) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (evidence of 0.10% or more blood alcohol
by weight prima facie proof of intoxication); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-8(c) (Supp. 1983)
(evidence of 0.10% or more blood alcohol by weight prima facie proof that person
was under influence of alcohol).
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establishment of formal alcohol education programs., I These programs offer counseling and reeducation for those capable of confronting a drinking-and-driving problem and reforming their behavior.
Cooperation with the police, including submission to testing, may be
the only means of entry into these programs. Doubts about taking
the test might thus be resolved through an awareness of the positive
options opened by consenting to testing and not contesting DUIA
charges. The DUIA-accused now lacks any understanding of these
options.
(b) Effects of Implied Consent BAC Testing Procedures on the
Fairness of the Adjudicatory Process
Implied consent statutes impose a choice at a time when the accused has had no communication with the outside world, lacks critically
important information, and may be subject to impaired judgment.
As indicated in the previous section, the information supplied by the
police totally fails to alert the accused to many of the potentially
devastating consequences of the testing decision or to the dangers inherent in the circumstances surrounding the choice. The existing system
thus creates a substantial risk that important rights will be lost at
the pre-testing stage.
A most obvious danger is that the police will fail to comply with
the minimal duty to inform the suspect of his or her limited statutory
rights. These statutes fail to expressly provide sanctions for noncompliance, and courts have been very reluctant to provide any meaningful remedy for their violation."19 A right of access to counsel would
at least ensure compliance with these threshold statutory duties.
There is also a significant danger of confusion over rights conferred by Miranda and the absence of such rights under implied consent laws. The accused is informed of the rights to remain silent and
to appointed counsel, but is then told almost immediately that these
rights do not extend to the breathalyzer choice. The Supreme Court
118. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24D (West Supp. 1983-1984).
Section 24D states, in part:
Any person convicted of or charged with operating a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, may, if he consents, be placed on probation for not more than two years and shall, as a condition of probation,
be assigned to a driver alcohol education program . . . and, if deemed
necessary by the court, to an alcohol treatment or rehabilitation program
or to both . . ..
Id.
119. See supra notes 31-33.
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has expressly held that Miranda does not apply to post-arrest questioning restricted to whether the suspect will submit to testing under
implied consent laws.' 0 Failure to understand the Miranda rights might
lead to a refusal to say or do anything prior to having a lawyer pre2
sent, which might then result in a finding of constructive refusal.' '
Alternatively, submission could lead to the making of statements which
22
the police could construe as a waiver of Miranda rights.' Although
some courts have reversed convictions or license revocations based
23
on confusion over Miranda rights and implied consent obligations,'
this case-by-case approach fails to recognize the practical dilemma
facing the DUIA suspect and the harmful effects of the inherently
24
contradictory nature of the proferred advice.'
120. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923 n.15.
121. See supra notes 39 & 72.

122. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) and Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), indicating that a waiver of constitutional rights must be
voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
123. See, e.g., Rees v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 8 Cal. App. 3d 756,
87 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1970); Calvert v. State Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div.,
184 Colo. 214, 519 P.2d 341 (1974); State v. Serevino, 56 Hawaii 378, 537 P.2d
1187 (1975); Swan v. Department of Pub. Safety, 311 So. 2d 498 (La. Ct. App.
1975); State Dep't of Highways v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N.E.2d 441 (1971);
cf. Shoemaker v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 11 Wash. App. 860, 526 P.2d 908
(1974) (driver's refusal to take BAC test did not result from confusion; therefore
the suspension of the driver's license upheld). See also Comment, Criminal LawAccusatory Stage of Proceedings-Custody Test Requires Miranda Warnings After
DWI Arrest, 57 N.D.L. REv. 673 (1981); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211

N.W.2d 906 (1973).
124. See, e.g., Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated as
moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982). The court stated:
It is difficult for the Court to reconcile the apparent contradictions between
the Miranda warnings, which allow the right to counsel, and an implied
consent statute, which denies the person the right to consult an attorney
prior to making a decision to submit to testing. It must be impossible for

the driver, forced to make an immediate decision which later may be used
to convict him or her of a crime, to reconcile these contradictions.

Id. at 651 (emphasis added).

Postponing administration of the Miranda warnings is hardly an effective solution to this dilemma. Attorney F. Lee Bailey, in describing his personal experience
in California, has alluded to the consequences of this approach. F.L. BItEY, supra
note 6. According to Bailey, the practice at certain times in California is for the
police to administer all sobriety tests before interrogating a DUIA suspect. There
is no right to counsel directly applicable to the breathalyzer decision, but, under

Miranda, there is such a right regarding all other questioning of the accused. The
probable effect of the California approach is that a drunk driving suspect will be
taken into custody without ever having been given an opportunity to explain his
activities prior to the arrest. This creates a classic "Catch 22": the police cannot

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Some courts and commentators have approached the right to consult issue in terms of the dangers presented by the lack of access to
the defendant's ability to effectively defend at trial.'2 5 In cases in which
there is either no statutory right to call counsel, no right to call until
preliminary matters including testing have been completed, or noncompliance with the statutory duty to permit a call, the risk exists
that exculpatory evidence may be irretrievably lost or aspects of the
accused's defense irreparably harmed. Some common examples may
be noted.
The prosecution of a DUIA case will typically be built on the
results of blood alcohol tests, if any, items of physical evidence, and
the testimony of police regarding observations of the defendant's
physical appearance, behavior, speech and attitude. On these latter
points, it may be essential to obtain a witness who is neither a police
officer, suspect or station house inmate, who can provide countervailing testimony of these matters.' 26 Any significant delay in con-

tacting such a witness may totally deprive the defendant of the only
meaningful evidence available to contradict the police version of facts

pertaining to the defendant's actions while in custody.' 27

Similarly, a vital element of the DUIA defense may involve
reconstructing the defendant's activities during the period prior to ar-

rest. This may require contacting and interviewing witnesses to the

engage in general questioning of the accused without offering the Miranda rights,
yet this questioning might remove any suspicion of intoxication or demonstrate a
credible if not conclusive defense to a DUIA charge. Id. at 39-41. This practice of
foregoing Miranda questioning in order to avoid confusion over the absence of a
right to counsel at the testing stage is an inefficient use of police resources and can
lead to unnecessary infringements on the liberty interests of the DUIA arrestee.
125. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 442-43, 452, 610 P.2d at 897, 902
(citing Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 739-40, 409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966)); Heles,
530 F. Supp. at 652; Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1213-14 (Alaska 1983) ("a

violation [of the right to contact counsel] has an effect on the defendant's ability
to present a defense at trial"); see also F.L. BAILEY, supra note 6; Comment, The

Drinking Driver and South Dakota's Implied Consent-The Need for Counsel, 23
S.D.L. REv. 403, 414 (1978).
126. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 452-53, 610 P.2d at 897.
127. [1] had come to a terrifying realization: The only witnesses in the station
were policemen and their prisoners. The hostility of the police officers was
about as subtle as the quills on an angry porcupine, and the credibility of
the prisoners was not likely to hold much sway with a jury. I needed a
respectable citizen who could at least say that my speech was ordered,
coherent, and showed no trace of a slur. The telephone was the only way
I could put myself in the presence of such a witness. . ..
F.L. BAILEY, supra note 6, at 23-24 (emphasis added).
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accused's conduct, alcohol ingestion, and apparent sobriety during
this period. If these witnesses are not personally known to the defen-

dant or are transients, delay in starting an investigation may result

in their being permanently lost to the defense.
Alternatively, the police may have conducted a post-arrest search

of the accused's car or personal belongings and seized items of physical

evidence. These might be inculpatory (empty alcoholic beverage containers) or exculpatory (documents showing the defendant's
whereabouts or activities prior to the arrest). In either case, steps may
have to be taken to make a record of these items or to preserve them

for later use at trial. The danger that helpful evidence may "disap-

pear" cannot be overlooked.
There is also the possibility that the accused's right to a fair trial
may be diminished due to his lack of information regarding various
aspects of the mechanical administration of blood alcohol tests or
the right to have a specimen of the test results. It has been estab-

lished that malfunctioning of certain breathalyzer testing devices is
quite common." 8 The accused's ability to reconstruct the testing process in terms of the type of machine, its location (exposure to radio
frequency interference), the warm-up and mechanical steps followed

128. The inaccuracy, unreliability and variability of breathalyzer blood alcohol
content readings is a matter of central importance to this aspect of a due process
analysis. This article has emphasized the widespread reliance on breathalyzer testing
and the overwhelming evidentiary weight accorded test results. If it is shown that
current BAC analysis methods are potentially inaccurate and that a challenge to the
reliability of the testing is a substantial defense at trial, a right of access to legal
advice prior to testing, would have strong fundamental fairness underpinnings. See
generally Single Test, supra note 10, at 69 (description of the state-of-the-art in
breathalyzer testing, the physiological effects of alcohol consumption and the processes of alcohol absorption by the body).
The primary causes of inaccurate readings are improper service or maintenance
of breathalyzer machines, administration of the test by untrained personnel, and,
most importantly, radio frequency interference (RFI) during testing. See Kelly & Trantino, Radio Frequency Interference and the Breathalyzer: A Case Analysis, 31 R.I.

B. J. 6 (1983) (describing expert studies on breathalyzers presented in civil action
to enjoin use in Rhode Island of breath test results made on Smith & Wesson model
900A breathalyzers or breathalyzers not properly certified by State Department of
Health); see also R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES (MB) § 20.03 (1977);
LIMITED ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TESTING OF EVIDENTIAL BREATH TESTERS,
NHTSA TECHNICAL REPORT (1983); DOT HS-306-400 (9 out of 16 breathalyzer

machines tested by U.S. Bureau of Standards found to be susceptible to RFI during
use). Cf. Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 62 (Minn. 1983) (expert testimony

established at trial that Smith & Wesson breathalyzer models 900 and 900A, when

properly tested and certified, were " 'reliable and accurate means of measuring alcohol
concentration.' ").
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by the police will directly bear on a successful repudiation of the test

results at trial. Valid challenges to the unreliability of the test may
be lost if the suspect is not alerted to the need for careful observation of each step of the process. Similarly, if the suspect has a right

to a sample of the test specimen or test results,' 29 this right must
be exercised when the test is made or be permanently lost.
One court has partially premised a limited right of access on the
need to guard against police abuse of discretion in the handling of
DUIA cases.' 30 An officer may be quite flexible in one case in pro-

viding access to a phone, offering advice on the accused's situation
or otherwise generally protecting the defendant's rights. The same officer, or others on the force, may in other cases openly mislead the
accused, fail to offer meaningful recognition of statutory rights, or
unreasonably apply the implied consent law (as, for example, by hastily

and arbitrarily construing the defendant's uncertainty as a constructive refusal to submit). The court in Heles found this potential for

abuse in the administration of implied consent laws to be so great

that, in the court's opinion, only a uniform right of limited access
to counsel in all DUIA cases would remove the risks.'

(c) Access to Counsel as a Procedural Protection of the Rights
of a DUIA Suspect
If it is accepted that the totality of circumstances existing at the

BAC testing decision stage renders the operation of implied consent
laws fundamentally unfair, the only remaining question is whether

the suggested procedural protection, a limited opportunity for the

DUIA suspect to consult with a lawyer, would substantially remove
that unfairness without defeating important countervailing governmental interests.' 32

129. At least two states mandate by statute that a separate breath sample specimen
be preserved for use by the defendant. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 752(5) (West
Supp. 1983-1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1203(a) (Supp. 1983). A similar right
was judicially established in Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256
(Alaska 1982); Baca v. Smith, 124 Ariz. 353, 604 P.2d 617 (1979); Gracia v. District
Ct., 197 Colo. 38, 589 P.2d 924 (1979). The right was rejected in People v. Miller,
52 Cal. App. 3d 666, 125 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1975); State v. Young, 228 Kan. 355,
614 P.2d 441 (1980); State v. Cornelius, 122 N.H. 925, 452 A.2d 464 (1982). See
generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
130. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652-53; see also Holland v. Parker, 469 F.2d 1013,
1015 (8th Cir. 1972).
131. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652-53.
132. The modified Mathews v. Eldridge due process methodology and cases considering the right to counsel issue recognize that due process rights are subject to
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Clearly, the right of consultation with counsel proposed by this
article would cover every one of the matters suggested in the previous
sections. The facts of each case, including the type of implied consent
statute applicable in the jurisdiction and the scope of the statutory
protections available, will significantly affect the nature of the communication between lawyer and detainee. However, the crucial nature
of the decisions to be made at the pre-testing stage, and the effects
on subsequent judicial proceedings of the circumstances existing prior
to, during and immediately after a refusal or submission to testing,
create precisely the type of situation to which the right to counsel
has historically attached.' 33
Even a short telephone conversation with counsel could cover
such matters as the unstated consequences of a decision to submit
or refuse, the need to identify and preserve exculpatory evidence, the
importance of observation of testing devices and procedures, and the
immediate potential criminal consequences of noncooperation.
Counsel's presence at the police station or jail house may be necessary
and practically possible, or the attorney may send some third party
to assist the accused. A right to communicate with the "outside world"
would also serve as a check on police arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion.
Heles effectively addressed a final element of this due process
analysis of the right of access. Where there is a threatened deprivation of important rights which would be substantially removed by
imposition of a specified procedural safeguard, the modified Mathews
test and generalized due process principles require consideration of
any overriding governmental justifications for rejecting a proposed
procedural right."'3 The state has asserted, and numerous courts have
accepted,' 35 the argument that provision of a right to counsel would
frustrate the state's interest in obtaining evidence of intoxication in
a timely fashion.' 36 This objection is easily overcome by placing pracoverriding governmental interests, even if it is demonstrated that a proposed procedural protection will substantially reduce the risk that important rights will be lost
through governmental action. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319.
133. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. 1975); Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 61, 181 N.E.2d 427, 429, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405
(Van Voorhis, J., concurring), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962); Seders v. Powell,
298 N.C. 453, 463, 259 S.E.2d 544, 549 (1979).
136. In the broadest sense, the state's interest expressed in drunk driving legislation, including implied consent laws, is "protecting the safety of its people . . .
[by] preserving the safety of its public highways." Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S.
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tical limitations on a right of access. The flexible nature of due process can accommodate these societal concerns without completely foreclosing expanded procedural protection.
A judicially created right of access would be limited by the exigencies of the BAC testing process and the underlying public policy
values expressed in implied consent laws. The primary limitation would
take the form of restricting a right of access to a relatively narrow
time frame.' 37 The exact time period would be influenced by a number
of factors. At the very least, BAC testing devices require some "warmup" period during which access could be provided.' 35 Some time must
also be spent by the police on miscellaneous administrative matters
relating to the suspect's detention. It is particularly important to note
that the rate of alcohol dissipation from the body is sufficiently slow
that short delays in test administration will not normally prevent effective testing.' 3 9 In certain circumstances a delay may even result in
higher BAC readings.' °
The Heles approach reflects these considerations. That court held
that the opportunity to call counsel embodied in a right of access
would continue until such time as delay would "affect the accuracy
of the tests [or] defeat the purpose of the implied consent law."''
Heles noted the minimum twenty minute warm-up period for a
breathalyzerl 2 while other cases indicate longer periods. ' Although
at 17. The specific policies of implied consent laws are deterrence of drunken driv-

ing, facilitation of evidence-gathering, and removal of dangerous drivers from the
highways. Id. at 18; see also Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 653; State v. Jones, 457 A.2d

1116, 1120-21 (Me. 1983).

137. See, e.g., Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 653; Hall, 60 Mich. App. at 440, 231

N.W.2d at 399; Newton, 291 Or. at 809, 636 P.2d at 406.
138. See supra note 128; infra notes 142-43.

139. See, e.g., Single Test, supra note 10, at 73.
140. Single Test, supra note 10, at 87.
141. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 653.
142. Id.

143. Id. The outer time limit for a valid test has been defined in terms of hours
rather than minutes, and, in some cases, no time limit has been set. See, e.g., People

v. Cords, 75 Mich. App. 415, 425, 254 N.W.2d 911, 916 (1977) (blood sample must
be "timely taken"); State v. Alexander, 16 N.C. App. 95, 99, 191 S.E.2d 395, 398
(1972) (test almost four hours after accident was "relevant and of probative value");

Commonwealth v. Tylwalk, 258 Pa. Super. 506, 510, 393 A.2d 473, 474 (1978) (test
more than four hours after incident leading to arrest held admissible). Time limitations have also been statutorily established. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194

(McKinney 1983) (breath, blood, urine or saliva test may be given within two hours
after arrest or within two hours after a "screening" breath test has confirmed some
alcohol consumption); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.235 (West 1966) (test evidence is admissible if sample is taken within two hours "after event to be proved" without
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a precise time need not be specified, "[i]f an attorney cannot be
reached by telephone within a reasonable period of time, the [DUIA
suspect] may need to make an independent decision without aid of
counsel, so as not to unnecessarily delay administration of the test. 14 "
This form of reasonable access to legal advice after booking and
prior to testing will preserve the state's compelling need to remove
drunk drivers from the highways and successfully prosecute criminal
violations of drunk driving statutes. Such access, however, will respect
the individual's right to fundamentally fair procedures within the due
process protections of the fourteenth amendment.
B. THE BREATHALYZER DECISION AS A SIXTH AMENDMENT
"CRITICAL STAGE" IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS

Section A contains an extended description of the highly
vulnerable position of the DUIA suspect at the breathalyzer testing
stage.' 5 This analysis of the due process rights of the accused, while
constituting an independent and legally self-sufficient basis for a right
of access to counsel,'4 6 also provides a strong foundation for consideration of the sixth amendment 4 7 implications of the BAC testing
decision.'14 Most of the reasons for establishing a due process right
apply with equal force to sixth amendment protection.
A due process analysis demonstrates that implied consent procedures are fundamentally unfair in that the imbalance of power between the state and the accused at the testing stage creates a risk

requiring expert testimony as to its effect, but if taken after two hours, expert
testimony is required to establish its probative value).
144. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 653.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 105-18.
146. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion), recognized that
police pre-trial practices are subject to separate challenges under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. The Court observed that police abuses "are not beyond the reach
of the Constitution even if they are not specifically covered by the Sixth Amendment," and identified due process as an alternative basis for their review. Id. at
691-92; see also'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Stoval v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967); State v. Hall, 93 N.J. 552, 461 A.2d 1155, cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 526 (1983) (pre-arrest detention and lineup procedures subject to due process
limitations including right to presence of counsel during pre-indictment line up).
147. See supra note 56 for text of sixth amendment.
148. See generally Comment, supra note 125, at 412-15 (discussing applicability.
of sixth amendment to implied consent choice); Comment, The Right to Counsel
Under California'sImplied Consent Statute, 9 U. WEST L.A. L.

REV.

73, 78-83 (1977)

(arguing that the decision on testing-required by California law is a "critical stage"
under sixth amendment).
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of permanent loss of substantive rights and the potential denial of
a fair trial.'"9 In these circumstances, the values embodied in the sixth
amendment right to counsel and the vital role it plays in our system
of criminal justice require treatment of the unique circumstances of
the pre-testing stage of a drunk driving prosecution as a "critical
stage'' 150 for sixth amendment right to counsel purposes."'
The United States Supreme Court has found critical stages at
which the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at various points
52
' Kirby v. Illinois,
prior to the commencement of a formal trial.
however, seems to draw an absolute line limiting critical stages to
an encounter "after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
3 With only one
indictment, information, or arraignment."'
149. See supra notes 105-31 and accompanying text.
150. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 683.
151. This article proposes only that there be a right of reasonable access to
counsel. The state's need to promptly administer a blood alcohol test (prior to dissipation of blood alcohol content by passage of time) and its legitimate interest in obtaining highly relevant evidence through fair procedures make the sixth amendment
rights of the accused prior "to testing something less than the absolute right to the
presence of counsel normally imposed by the amendment. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
The exigencies of the testing situation require a hybrid form of sixth amendment protection structured in the same manner as a due process right of access.
See supra notes 137-44. That is, the right would be restricted to reasonable access
during the period between arrest, booking and the time by which the testing must
occur or the sample will be lost.
152. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1969) (preliminary hearing prior to indictment); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967) (pre-trial
lineup); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967) (post-indictment lineup);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (electronically monitored statements
by indicted defendant while free on bail); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)
(magistrate's preliminary hearing); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961)
(arraignment); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459-61 (1937) (arraignment and trial
consecutively on same day); cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975) (informal probable cause hearing on prosecutor's information not a "critical stage" where
no threat to effective defense on the merits was created).
153. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689. In Kirby, the defendant and a companion were
charged with robbery of one Willie Shard. The two were initially taken into custody
on unrelated charges. An inquiry at the police station revealed a report of the Shard
robbery. Kirby had traveler's checks and a Social Security card in Shard's name
at the time of arrest. Shard was immediately brought to the police station where,
upon entering the room in which defendant was located, he promptly identified the
two men as the perpetrators of the robbery the day before. At the time of the identification, neither of the accused had been advised of a right to the presence of counsel
nor had they made a request for legal assistance. At trial six weeks later, Shard
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exception,

54

every court deciding the issue under a Kirby standard

has held that the point at which a DUIA arrestee must make the

testing choice required by implied consent laws is not a "critical stage"
for sixth amendment purposes.'5"A brief description of Kirby'provides the essential framework for analysis of this constitutional claim.
The Kirby plurality' 5 6 refused to extend to pre-indictment lineups

the holdings of United States v. Wade' and Gilbert v. California'6
that a post-indictment lineup is a critical stage of a prosecution requiring notice to and the presence of counsel prior to displaying the
defendant for identification,' 59 and that evidence in the form of incourt identifications based on or influenced by lineups conducted in

the absence of counsel is inadmissible at trial.' 6 The Kirby ruling
turned on a broad distinction between "routine police investigation'" 6'
and the formal "initiation of ... judicial criminal proceedings." '' 62

Commencement of adversary judicial proceedings signified to the Court
the government's commitment to prosecution and the solidification

of the defendant's adverse position.' 63 According to Justice Stewart,
it is only at this point that the change in the nature of the parties'
relationship causes the defendant to be fully "faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies
of substantive and procedural criminal law. '"6" The need for assistance

of counsel, and the existence of a sixth amendment "critical stage,"

was permitted to testify concerning the police station encounter and to identify the
men again in the courtroom. Id. at 684-85.
154. State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 445, 610 P.2d 893, 898-99, vacated
and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980). Heles,
530 F. Supp. at 652, alluded to the sixth amendment only in terms of its "due process demands."
155. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116, 1118-19 n.5 (Me. 1983); Holmberg
v. 54-A Judicial Dist. Judge, 60 Mich. App. 757, 760, 23 N.W.2d 543, 544 (1975);
Spradling v. Deimeke, 538 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Mo. 1975); Price v. State Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 36 N.C. App. 698, 700, 245 S.E.2d 518, 521-22 (1978); McNulty
v. Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 345, 328 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1975); State v. Newton,
291 Or. 788, 807, 636 P.2d 393, 403-04 (1981).
156. Justices Stewart, Burger, Blackmun and Rehnquist were joined by Justice
Powell concurring in the result. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and White
dissented.
157. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
158. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
159. Id. at 272.
160. Id. at 273.
161. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690.
162. Id. at 689.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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does not arise until such circumstances exist. Since a pre-indictment
lineup occurs prior to a formal charge or other judicial proceedings,
the Court declined to "import into a routine police investigation an
absolute constitutional guarantee historically and rationally applicable
' 65
only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings."'
This tightly mechanical formula for measuring the existence of
sixth amendment rights is supported, therefore, by the vaguely stated
rationale that the interests of a criminally accused prior to "formal
charging" are always legally insufficient to require the assistance of
a lawyer for " 'consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation.' 166 This article contends that the BAC testing stage involves
much more than routine police investigation.' 67 A sensitive application of Kirby principles, with their emphasis on confrontations with
165. Id. at 690.
166. Id. at 688-89 n.6 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
167. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28, contained dicta which might be construed to
remove the BAC testing phase as a "critical stage" without regard to Kirby. The
Government argued that a post-indictment lineup was merely a "preparatory stage
in the gathering of the prosecution's evidence, not different-for sixth amendment
purposes-from various other preparatory steps such as systematized or scientific
analyzing of the accused's finger prints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like."
Id. at 227. The Wade Court rejected this view as applied to lineups, distinguishing
scientific testing on the following grounds:
Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently
available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has
the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case
at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government's expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own
experts. The denial of a right to have his counsel present at such analyses
does not therefore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such states might
derogate from his right to a fair trial.
Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added). This article demonstrates that the BAC testing stage
is qualitatively different from the "mere preparatory . . gathering of ... evidence,"
involved in the processes referred to in Wade. See supra notes 105-31 and accompanying text. The significance of the rights at stake at the pre-testing stage, the difficulties of reconstructing certain aspects of the process at trial, and the ensuing
risk that lack of access may "derogate from [the] right to a fair trial," 388 U.S.
at 228, militate against blind adherence to the Court's position in the Wade dicta.
Contra State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116, 1119 n.5 (Me. 1983) ("The test is, in fact,
a 'mere preparatory step'; the officers . . . can do nothing to impair the defendants'
subsequent fair trial.").
A further distinction lies in the nature of the sixth amendment right at issue
here. It is proposed only that the DUIA suspect have access to legal advice; no suggestion is made that the state be required to make counsel "present" at the police
station as is normally required by the sixth amendment. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
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state prosecutorial authorities in which the accused needs help facing
the "intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law,"1 68 strongly
supports some form of sixth amendment protection for the drunk
driving suspect.
The Washington case of State v. Fitzsimmons169 is the only postKirby case to explicitly adopt this position in finding a sixth amendment right to counsel at the pre-testing stage. Even though its precedential value has been diminished by procedural developments in the
case, 7' Fitzsimmons is a powerful exposition of the reasons why a

sixth amendment right of access should be recognized.

Justice Horowitz' opinion for the unanimous court applied a three
part standard for measuring the existence of a right to counsel under
the amendment. In addition to the Kirby criterion of "initiation of
judicial criminal proceedings,"'' existence of the right required a pre-

trial confrontation in which the accused's "right to a fair trial or

other substantial rights"' 7 2 might be affected and a situation in which
the advice or presence of counsel would "aid [the accused] in coping
with legal problems or . . . in meeting his adversary. '
These factors closely parallel the fundamental fairness rationale
168. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
169. 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893, vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 997,
aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980). Fitzsimmons was stopped by the police
at 11:00 P.M. on September 27, 1977, after his vehicle was observed swerving across
the center line of the road on which he was travelling. Field sobriety tests were administered based on detection of a strong odor of alcohol on the suspect's breath
and the fact that his eyes were watery. Mr. Fitzsimmons was then arrested, placed
in custody, and charged by citation with driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. A mobile DWI van arrived at 11:30 P.M. Fitzsimmons was given Miranda
warnings, to which he responded by asking for an appointed attorney and "the right
to legal advice right now." The police informed him that he could have counsel
"'at the time of pre-trial or at arraignment.' " Fitzsimmons, at some unspecified
later time, refused to take a breathalyzer test and was subsequently convicted of
DUIA. Id. at 439-40, 610 P.2d at 895-96.
170. The United States Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certiorari,
vacated the judgment in the case, and remanded for clarification on whether the
result in Fitzsimmons was based on federal constitutional law or an independent interpretation of state law. 449 U.S. 977 (1980). See supra note 53. On remand, the
Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier opinion but pointed out that its
result involved "primary independent reliance on [a] state court rule" establishing
a right of access to counsel. 94 Wash. 2d 858, 858, 620 P.2d 999, 1000 (1980). The
court described its sixth amendment discussion as being "supportive of the analysis
of court rule provisions" but refused to repudiate that discussion. Id. at 859, 620
P.2d at 1001.
171. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
172. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 444, 610 P.2d at 898.
173. Id. at 445, 610 P.2d at 898 (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
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of a due process analysis in at least two respects. Under the Fitzsimmons test, the inquiry is whether there are important individual rights
at stake which may be lost at a particular procedural stage and whether
an asserted procedural safeguard will provide meaningful protection
for those rights. Application of this sixth amendment test leads to
that are strikingly similar to those reached under due proconclusions
74
1
cess.
Justice Horowitz' consideration of the first requirement, initiation
of Kirby-type judicial proceedings, is the most technically objectionable
aspect of the case. It was found that the issuance of a citation by
the police charging the suspect with drunk driving constituted the commencement of formal proceedings for Kirby purposes.1'7 Regardless
of the outcome of subsequent testing procedures, the court accepted7
the accused's obligation to answer the citation "in a judicial court" 1
as the functional equivalent of a formal charge under Kirby.
The Oregon Supreme Court's rejection of this aspect of Fitzsimmons in People v. Newton asserts that this approach "disregarded
the principal holding of Kirby that the concept [of "critical stage"]
is limited to confrontations after a formal charge is laid."' 7 7 This
view, which consistently appears in decisions rejecting sixth amendment claims,' 7 8 may overlook the ambiguity of the Kirby standard.
The definition in Kirby of the commencement of judicial proceedings

in terms of "formal

charge

.

.

. indictment,

[or]

information,"' 7 9 is far from self-explanatory. In Kirby the defendant
was under arrest and in custody, but not directly charged with having committed a crime at the time the station house identification
was made. It could be argued that Fitzsimmons is immediately
distinguishable in that issuance of a written citation is a more concrete indication of intent to prosecute than the showing of a person
to a crime victim either individually or in a lineup with other suspects.
The deeper conceptual issue raised by Kirby, however, involves consideration of when the transition occurs from investigation to prosecution in criminal cases.
An indictment or information is normally the exclusive method
for commencing a serious criminal case. 8 ' At the very least, Justice
313 (1973)) (sixth amendment does not require presence of counsel at post-indictment
photographic display at which accused is not present).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
175. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 444, 610 P.2d at 898.
176. Id.
177. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 806, 636 P.2d 393, 404 n.9 (1981).
178. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 684-85.
179. Id. at 689.
180. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 263, §4 (West Supp. 1983-1984) which
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Stewart must have had some other procedure in mind when he referred in Kirby to a third means, "formal charge," as establishing the
presence of a "critical stage."' 8 ' In less serious cases, issuance of a
complaint by a clerk after an informal probable cause hearing might
meet this requirement.' 82 Kirby may also be open to an interpretation
which would place the point of commencement of criminal proceedings

earlier in the process and make any accusation against a targeted in-

dividual a sufficient charging for right to counsel purposes. If Kirby
contemplates the likelihood of eventual court appearance as a measure
of sixth amendment rights, the arrest, citation and booking of a DUIA
suspect would, as in Fitzsimmons, satisfy the test.
This reading of Kirby would remain true to the plurality's distinction between routine investigation and prosecution.' 83 Police procedures
designed to identify the accused as the perpetrator of a crime are
properly treated as different from those focusing on procuring evidence

of guilt directly from a person who is in custody for an arrest based

on police observation. With this latter potential defendant, the mere

states:
No person shall be held to answer in any court for an alleged crime, except
upon an indictment by a grand jury or upon a complaint before a district
court ....
A defendant charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment
.. .shall have the right to be proceeded against by indictment except when
the offense charged is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the district and
superior courts and the district court retains jurisdiction.
Id.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure read:
An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a termexceeding one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment or,
if indictment is waived, it may be prosecuted by information. Any other
offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information. An information may be filed without leave of court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
181. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
182. Compare Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (preliminary probable cause hearing prior to presenting case to grand jury is sixth amendment critical
stage) with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118-26 (1975) (informal hearing on probable cause to detain arrested person pending further proceedings consistent with fourth
amendment is not a critical stage). Contra Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass.
393, 36 N.E.2d 912 (1982) ("The issuance of a complaint and an arrest warrant
does not constitute the commencement of 'adversary proceedings' entitling a defendant to the assistance of counsel."). See also Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 380
Mass. 878, 884, 401 N.E.2d 802, 806-07 (1980).
183. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690.
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absence of formal prosecutorial charging is of little relevance to the
need for legal advice or the risk of prejudice and loss of rights adhering
in a pre-trial confrontation such as submission to BAC testing.' 84 This
is exactly the position adopted in Fitzsimmons under the second and
third right to, counsel criteria-presence of a pre-trial confrontation
in which the right to a fair trial is jeopardized, and a role for counsel
' These tests, based on Justice Brento play in reducing this threat. 85
nan's opinion for the dissent in Kirby, represent an alternative to the
rigid approach of the Kirby plurality.
The Kirby dissenters found that the "formal charge" cutoff point
for sixth amendment rights established by the plurality wholly ignored
both the reasons for extending the protections of counsel to pre-trial
proceedings and the fundamental rationales of Wade, Gilbert and
related cases. According to the dissent, the proper sixth amendment
right to counsel focus should be on the " 'potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights [inhering] in the particular [pre-trial] confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.'
))186 In particular, it must be asked whether " 'counsel's absence
[would] derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial' "I87 because

of the difficulty of reconstructing allegedly prejudicial or improper
police practices. 88' A strict application of the Kirby plurality standard precludes any inquiries along these lines. Ultimately, the rule
that there can never be a sufficient threat to a fair trial or loss of
substantial defenses through the denial of access to counsel prior to
commencement of formal judicial proceedings seriously jeopardizes
sixth amendment values by potentially isolating from judicial scrutiny
oppressive, overbearing or fundamentally unfair police conduct.
Fitzsimmons engages in a particularized analysis of sixth amendment rights under the standards of the Kirby dissent as expressed in
Justice Horowitz' three part test. The court's conclusion was that
failure to provide access to counsel at the BAC testing stage could
lead to an unfair trial and that a limited sixth amendment right to
consult with a lawyer was the appropriate procedural protection for
avoiding this danger. 89
The reasons for establishment of a form of sixth amendment protection were essentially the same as those supporting a due process
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 696-97 (Brennan,
See supra notes 172-73.
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 694
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 694
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 695
Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash.

J., dissenting).
(quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227).
(quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27).
(citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 231-32).
2d at 450, 610 P.2d at 900.
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right. The period surrounding the BAC testing stage was a "critical
stage" because of "the unique character of the evidence to be obtained and the trial strategy decisions which must be made then [prior
to testing], if at all."' 90 Access to counsel was particularly critical
because of the "importance of intoxication as an element of the of9
fense" of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.' ' Effective preparation of the only defense to such a charge, non-intoxication,
might require acquisition of testimony by disinterested witnesses to
the defendant's condition or police handling of the case, procurement
of an independent BAC test, and, perhaps, observation of police ad92 Implicit in the court's analysis
ministration of a breathalyzer test.
was the additional assumption that the very decision whether to submit to testing constituted an essential aspect of the structuring of trial
defenses. 193 Without some form of legal assistance on these matters
"the results [of this confrontation between prosecution and accused]
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial to a mere
formality." 19"
Fitzsimmons stands for the proposition that this type of fundamental unfairness is as appropriately addressed by the protections afforded
by a sixth amendment opportunity to obtain legal advice as it is by
the due process protections of the fourteenth amendment. Kirby should
95
not be construed as an absolute bar to such protection.'
C. FIFTH AMENDMENT ASPECTS OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL
CONTENT TESTING PROCESS

A right to counsel at the breath analysis decision and testing stages

190. Id.at 445, 610 P.2d at 898.
191. Id.at 445, 610 P.2d at 899.

192. See id. at 442, 610 P.2d at 897 (citing Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d
733, 739-40, 409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966)).
193. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 453, 610 P.2d at 902-03.
Mr. Fitzsimmons' attorney, had he been allowed to contact one, could have
advised him to take the State's proposed Breathalyzer test or arranged for
an independent Breathalyzer test . . . .Unbiased observations, blood tests,
and supervised Breathalyzer readings could have proved that the defendant
was not intoxicated at the time of his arrest and charging.

Id.

194. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
195. Strict adherence to the Kirby standard by federal courts will not preclude
state courts from applying the reasoning of this section to reach a contrary result
as a matter of state constitutional law. See supra note 53; cf. People v. Hawkins,
55 N.Y.2d 474, 435 N.E.2d 376, 450 N.Y.S.2d 159, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 103
(1982) (New York state constitution given same interpretation as sixth amendment
in Wade; no right to counsel at pre-indictment lineup).
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may arise from a finding that at those stages the accused enjoys the
protections of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 96' Miranda v. Arizona'9 7 is the most noteworthy
example of the prophylactic role of counsel in safeguarding fifth
amendment rights. In Miranda the Supreme Court concluded that an
absolute right to the advice and presence of a lawyer prior to custodial
interrogation of a criminal suspect was the only effective means of
protecting the privilege.' 9 If fifth amendment rights are infringed by
the operation of implied consent laws in either compelling a decision
to submit or producing incriminating evidence of guilt by the administration of BAC tests, a right of access to counsel similar to that
established in Miranda would properly attach.' 99
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in South Dakota
v. Neville 0 ° is a very serious obstacle to the establishment of such
a fifth amendment right, or of any other form of expanded procedural
protection for DUIA suspects. Neville is the only decision of the Court
to directly address a constitutional challenge to the criminal consequences of noncompliance with the obligation to submit to BAC testing
196. See supra note 55. The essential underlying policy of the fifth amendment
is that the government must "respect the inviolability of the human personality"

and "produce . . . evidence . . . by its own independent labors rather than by the
cruel simple expedient of compelling it from ... [the accused's] own mouth." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). See generally W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH

(1968) (historical background material on adoption and purposes of the
amendment).
Although the fifth amendment addresses only criminal proceedings, the Supreme
Court has held that the privilege against self-incrimination is also applicable in civil,
investigatory and juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 444-45 (1972). The Court has declared that the privilege guards "against any
compelled disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal
prosecution or [that] could lead to [the production of] other evidence that might
be so used." Id. at 445. The Supreme Court's refusal to limit the privilege to purely
criminal proceedings reflects the Court's belief that an inability to invoke the privilege
at one stage of a proceeding might render later invocation futile. See Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974).
197. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
198. Id. at 469-70.
199. As indicated at several points in this article, see, e.g., supra text accompanying note 151, the DUIA suspect would not enjoy a "pure" Miranda right to the
presence of counsel. The potential delay necessary to locate counsel and arrange for
his or her presence at the testing site precludes such protection. A right of access
under the fifth amendment, like that under the sixth and fourteenth amendments,
is thus limited to an ,opportunity to consult with an attorney within a reasonable
time after arrest.
200. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
AMENDMENT

[1984:2031

RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL

imposed by implied consent laws. "°' The Court held that the admission at trial of a DUIA suspect's refusal to submit to testing, as direct
evidence of guilt of the substantive offense of driving under the in0 2
fluence, did not violate the fifth amendment privilege.1 In reaching
this conclusion, Justice O'Connor's abbreviated opinion for the Court
2 3
strongly reaffirmed Schmerber v. California1 as the controlling statement of fifth amendment principles applicable to the pre-trial gathering of evidence by police. 0 4
The specific questions in Schmerber0 5 were whether the police

could constitutionally compel an individual arrested for driving while

intoxicated to submit to withdrawal of his blood to measure alcohol

content, and whether the results of such tests were admissible in court

as evidence of guilt. The Court held that the fifth amendment pre-

submission nor introduction of the test results
cluded neither20forced
6
into evidence.

201. Id. at 923-24. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), rejected a due process challenge to the civil license revocation procedures initiated after a refusal to test.
202. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 918.
203. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
204. See Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 920-23.
205. The defendant in Schmerber, after drinking at a tavern and a bowling alley,
was injured when the car he was driving struck a tree. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. While
being treated at a hospital for consequent injuries, the defendant was placed under
arrest by police. Id. at 758. After the arrest, the police directed a physician to withdraw
blood from the defendant, which was done over the defendant's objections. This
objection was based on the advice of counsel. Id. at 759. Chemical analysis of the
blood sample showed a percentage of alcohol which, under California law, indicated
intoxication. Id.
The defendant, in addition to claiming that his fifth amendment rights had been
violated, contended that the non-consensual withdrawal of blood constituted an
unreasonable search and seizure. Id.; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (citizenry shall
not be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure). Although acknowledging that
the fourth amendment was applicable, the Court held that the exigent circumstances,
the reasonable means the police employed to obtain the evidence, and the probable
cause for believing the defendant's blood contained evidence of intoxication justified
the warrantless search and seizure. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68. See generally supra
note 54 (discussing relationships between fourth amendment and blood, breath and
urine tests).
Schmerber was decided under a provision of California law, CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23102(a), now renumbered as § 23152(a), which made it a misdemeanor to drive
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. California law did not allow for
the type of implied consent right to refuse testing considered throughout this article,
nor did it treat drunk driving with the degree of severity currently found in state
legislation. See supra text accompanying notes 109-17 for an analysis of the significance
of these differences.
206. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

The essential protection of the fifth amendment is against forced
production of incriminating verbal testimony from a criminally accused. This includes the right to remain silent and to "suffer no penalty
. . for such silence." '
Schmerber defined these protections in terms
of a distinction between "testimony" or "communications" on the
one hand and "real or physical evidence" ' 8 on the other. Assuming
a finding of sufficient compulsion or coercion by the state, a violation of the privilege occurs only when the evidentiary product thereof
is characterizable as "testimonial" in the sense that the accused is
made to become a "witness against himself" 2 by giving statements
or their equivalent. The application of this standard in Schmerber
led Justice Brennan to the conclusion that "not even a shadow of
testimonial compulsion" existed in the forced withdrawal of a blood
sample from a DUIA suspect." ' The defendant's only participation
was that of a donor, which in no way implicated his "testimonial
capacities." 2' Because the blood analysis tests produced purely physical
evidence, no fifth amendment violation had occurred and the evidence
was admissible at trial. 2 '
The Court has applied the Schmerber testimonial/real evidence
distinction to other forms of pre-trial procedures. Fifth amendment
*

207. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
208. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64.
209. Id. at 761. The Court explained that the testimonial/real evidence distinction, although not formally termed such, has been applied historically in both federal
and state courts. Id. at 762-64; see Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910)
(because privilege against self-incrimination is applicable only to "compulsion to extort communications," court could lawfully require defendant to don blouse in court
for purpose of identification). See generally Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing
Exemplars and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1957)
(analyzing admissibility of voice and writing exemplars).
The Schmerber Court noted that forced submission to tests commonly considered
to adduce real or physical evidence might implicate testimonial capacities where the
"pain, danger, or severity" of such tests "would almost inevitably cause
a person
to prefer confession to undergoing the 'search'." 384 U.S. at 765 n.9. "Such incriminating evidence might be an unavoidable by-product of the compulsion to take
the test, especially for an individual who fears the extraction or opposes it on religious
grounds." Id. See generally Comment, Constitutional Limitations on the Taking of
Body Evidence, 78 YALE L.J. 1074 (1969). The Supreme Court of Minnesota found
Schmerber inapplicable to the taking of a breath, urine, or blood sample, with the
possible exception that an individual might resist the tests on religious grounds. State
v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 261-63, 212 N.W.2d 863, 868 (1973) (Peterson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
210. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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claims have been rejected in challenges to compelled utterance of words
2 3
spoken by an alleged robber in the holding of a lineup, " production
14 submission of
of a voice exemplar during grand jury proceedings,
21 5 and production of a taxpayer's personal
handwriting samples,
papers.2" 6 In all of these cases the Court found the communicative
content of the evidence insufficient to trigger fifth amendment protection. This type of "physical" evidence is neutral with regard to
the defendant's thoughts, feelings, mental processes or state of mind.
Given the continued vitality of the Schmerber approach, a fifth
amendment-based right of access to counsel at the breathalyzer choice
stage requires a showing that the breathalyzer test produces testimonial
or communicative evidence which is compelled by the state. Although
the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the matter, it is highly
likely that the Court would refuse to find fifth amendment violations
2 7
in the operation of implied consent laws. "
The Schmerber line of cases, buttressed by a similar approach
in .the lower courts,2" 8 strongly suggests that the result of a breathalyzertype test is physical, non-testimonial evidence similar to the blood
samples in Schmerber. Breathalyzer and blood withdrawal procedures
share the common effect of revealing objective information pertaining to the level of alcohol in the blood and, correspondingly, the
coordinative abilities of the driver. Breathalyzer tests are significantly
less intrusive than the procedures utilized in Schmerber and the earlier
9
case of Breithaupt v. Abram.' The accused's participation in the
213. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220-21 (1966).
214. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1973).
215. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
216. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976).
217. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765-66 n.9. The Court refused to rule on Schmerber's
contention that evidence relating to his refusal to test was a testimonial by-product
of the compulsion to take a breathalyzer test and was thus inadmissible under the
fifth amendment. The Court's holding was limited to a finding that the results of
a blood extraction procedure were not testimonial. Id. at 765. South Dakota v. Neville,
103 S. Ct. 916 (1983), resolved the issue of the admissibility of evidence of a refusal.
Id. at 922.
218. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Alaska 1979) (fifth amendment offers no protection against compulsion to take tests which elicit physical evidence
such as breathalyzer); State v. Charette, 110 R.I. 124, 132, 290 A.2d 858, 862 (1972)
(because breathalyzer adduces real evidence rather than testimonial, defendant's fifth
amendment rights not violated by introduction of test results).
219. 352 U.S. 432 (1957). In this case the Court found nothing constitutionally
objectionable in the withdrawal without consent of a blood sample from an unconscious accident victim prior to his being charged with a criminal offense. The
Court found no due process violation since the method employed was neither "brutal,"
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tests reveals nothing of his "subjective knowledge or thought pro2 20
cesses."
Schmerber does provide one possible basis for distinguishing the
present day implied consent testing process from the blood withdrawal
test in that case. Justice Brennan noted that:
[s]ome tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," for
example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may actually be directed at eliciting responses which
are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing
in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence
on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is
to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment."'

In practical terms, as noted at several points in this article,11 police
observation of the detainee's behavioral responses after arrest, including
the manner in which the accused answers police requests pursuant
to the implied consent laws and his actions in actually taking the test,
constitutes an independent source of evidence of the defendant's guilt
or innocence. Like field sobriety tests, the process of BAc testing
"may enable an observer to draw an inference as to guilt or innocence
directly from the subject's ability to perform the acts required of
him." 23 That these tests require more participation than that involved
in blood extraction might lead to the conclusion that in this context
the testimonial/real evidence distinction is "not readily drawn. ' 224
"offensive" nor one which "shocked the conscience." Id. at 435-37; see
also Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The accused's liberty interest in protecting
the inviolability of his body was outweighed by society's interest in identifying drunk
drivers and removing them from the highways. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439-40; see
also Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. at 777, 438 N.E.2d at 64.
220. Brennan, 386 Mass. at 777, 438 N.E.2d at 64.
221. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added).
222. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 126.
223. Brennan, 386 Mass. at 777, 438 N.E.2d at 64.
224. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. Since Schmerber, the Supreme Court has not
clarified the meaning of its warning against forced submission to tests which seek
to determine innocence or guilt on the basis of physiological response. The Indiana
Supreme Court in Heichelbech v. State, 258 Ind. 334, 340, 281 N.E.2d 102, 104
(1972), rejected the contention that the Schmerber admonition was applicable to roadside sobriety tests. The Heichelbech court declared that roadside sobriety tests are
entirely non-testimonial, and therefore, the police can compel submission to such
tests without implicating Schmerber. Id. at 339-40, 281 N.E.2d at 104-05. Courts have,
however, consistently referred to the dicta in Schmerber when refusing to allow the
state to force a defendant to submit to a polygraph test. See, e.g., Bowen v. Eyman,
324 F. Supp. 339, 341 (D. Ariz. 1970) (admission of testimony that defendant refused
to submit to a lie detector test violates privilege against self-incrimination); Com-
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Prior to Neville, lower court handling of fifth amendment claims
did not entirely foreclose this type of analysis or the possibility of
a broader finding that, in its totality, the overall process for obtaining consent and administering a BAC analysis test entails the coerced
production of testimonial evidence warranting some form of fifth
amendment protection. Several cases went at least as far as holding
that an actual or constructive refusal to test, as distinguished from
the test results, was a potentially incriminating expression of the
suspect's state of mind regarding the ability to pass the test, which
could be construed as an admission to being intoxicated, and was
2 5 Justice O'Connor's opinion in
therefore protected by the privilege.
Neville entirely bypassed the testimonial/real evidence aspects of the
'
refusal-to-test evidence.22 The Court rested its decision on the admismonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 431-32, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127 (1974) (results
of polygraph are testimonial in nature and therefore state cannot compel submission
to test); see also Hermann, Privacy, The Prospective Employee, and Employment
Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REv.
73, 130-31 (1971) (forcing accused to submit to polygraph would be constitutionally
infirmed); Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie
Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 699-700 (1961) (polygraph determines subjective state
of mind through analysis of objective criteria).
In United States v. Green, 282 F. Supp. 373 (S.D. Ind. 1968), a federal district
court cited Schmerber in denying a government motion to require an individual charged
with filing fraudulent claims with the United States to submit handwriting exemplars.
Id. at 375. Declaring the distinction between real and testimonial evidence to be
"nebulous," the Green court held that where the corpus of the crime alleged requires proof of an unlawful signature, and where the state seeks to compel a signature
germane to the prosecution's case, the evidence which the government seeks to compel is sufficiently testimonial to fall under the protective cloak of the fifth amendment. Id. at 373-74. But see State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 430, 558 P.2d
265, 269 (1976) (handwriting exemplar does not become testimonial where form required approximates that of offending instrument).
225. See Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 707-08 (Tex. 1977) (silence in response
to request to take tests constitutes tacit or overt expression of thoughts; since purpose of admitting refusal in court is to show jury accused's state of mind, evidence
should be excluded); accord State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 262-63, 212 N.W.2d
863, 864 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App.
607, 609, 188 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1972). But see Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514,
518 (9th Cir. 1969) (refusal to submit to testing is physical act); Campbell v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 553, 479 P.2d 685, 692 (1971) (refusal itself is not testimonial
communication).
The Dudley court interpreted Schmerber as mandating exclusion of evidence of
refusal on fifth amendment grounds. Dudley, 548 S.W.2d at 707-08. The court construed Schmerber as forbidding any compulsory communication of an accused's
thought processes, whether such thoughts were indicated by words, acts, or the lack
thereof. Id.
226. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 921-22 (1983). The Court did favorably cite the ra-
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sibility of the evidence solely on the second component of fifth amend-

ment analysis, the use of compulsion to obtain this evidence.227

Justice O'Connor found "[n]o impermissible coercion ... involved when the suspect refuses to submit to the test, regardless of
the form of the refusal.""22 This conclusion flowed inexorably from
the view that "Schmerber . . . clearly allows a state to force a person
suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol
test." 229 If the state possesses a virtually unrestricted right to administer

a test against the will of the suspect, it is equally free to limit that
right by legislatively offering an option to refuse.23 In the Court's
view, the "compulsion" involved in pressuring the DUIA suspect to
take the test was merely that generated by the need to make one of
many "difficult choices" imposed by the criminal process.' In the
absence of legally improper coercion, no fifth amendment rights were
implicated.232
South Dakota v. Neville summarily treated a most fundamental
aspect of the operation of implied consent laws-the nature of the

"rights" created by these statutes. There is logical consistency
in the

proposition that a state's power to physically coerce submission to
testing includes the lesser power to promote submission by attaching

serious and immediate consequences to the statutorily created option

of refusal. It is submitted, however, that the Neville analysis fails
to satisfactorily analyze several important aspects of the implied consent choice.

First, Neville is plainly wrong in its appraisal of the nature and
degree of coercion generated by the implied consent testing decision.

Lower federal and state courts have gone behind the mere characterizationale of a decision by the California Supreme Court that the refusal to submit
to a blood-alcohol test is physical circumstantial evidence of guilt similar to flight
from captivity. Id. at 921-22. See People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 546, 421 P.2d
401, 404, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393,.396 (1966) (no testimonial element involved in refusal
to take blood test), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967). Other state supreme courts,
however, have rejected the analogy between a refusal to take a blood test and flight,
reasoning that the latter instance is devoid of compulsion. See, e.g., Dudley v. State,
548 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1977); State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 2 (Mont. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983).
227. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 922.
228. Id. Justice O'Connor continued that "the state did not directly compel
respondent [driver] to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of submitting to
the test or refusing." Id.
229. Id. at 921.
230. Id. at 922.
231. Id. at 923.
232. Id.
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tion of the testing choice as a "right," "power," or "option," and
looked at the practical realities of the situation.23 Implied consent
provisions do empower an accused to refuse compliance with the "consent" to testing conferred in accepting the privilege of a driver's license.
The general policy behind a refusal option is the avoidance of "violent
confrontations" between police and suspect.1 4 The entire system,
however, is overwhelmingly weighted towards forcing the compliance
that the state unquestionably wants." The pressure to submit to testing
is neither disguised nor subtle.2 36 With practically no meaningful
awareness of the consequences and no opportunity to intelligently consider them, the accused must decide whether to produce the single
most incriminating item of evidence of guilt, proof of intoxication,
or surrender the right to drive, with all that may imply for job and
233. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 262-63, 212 N.W.2d 863, 864
(1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (quoting from Comment, supra note 209,
at 1084, that the provision of the option of refusal which removes the unpleasant
burden of undergoing test is an "inducement that casts doubt on the 'voluntariness'
" of evidence thereby obtained) (footnotes omitted); accord State v. Neville, 312
N.W.2d 723, 726 (S.D. 1981), rev'd sub nom. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct.
916 (1983).
Further, implied consent statutes commonly provide that a refusal to submit
to testing will result in an automatic suspension of a driver's license. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (individual who refuses
to submit to chemical test to measure alcohol content subject to ninety day license
revocation). The automatic license suspension penalty further demonstrates that the
individual does not have a true "choice" when pondering whether to take a
breathalyzer. See State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 804, 636 P.2d 393, 402 (1981) (where
consent to seizure is solicited by warning of substantial penalty imposed for refusal,
resulting consent is not exercise of free will).
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that implied consent statutes are
designed to coerce the individual into submitting to testing. Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979); see also Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 651.
234. Neville, 103 S.Ct. at 921.
235. Judicial recognition of the coercive underpinnings of implied consent laws
differs only in the explicitness of the language used by a court to characterize the
process. Compare Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 779, 438 N.E.2d 60,

65 ("we assume . ..that the 'choice' offered [by the implied consent statute] con-

stitutes compulsion") and Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 651 ("The obvious and intended

effect of the implied consent law is to coerce the driver . . . to consent.") with

Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (sanctions for the refusal to take the
test provide a "strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test . . .[in order to

produce] reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings")
and Neville, 103 S.Ct. at 923 ("The State wants [the driver] to choose to take the
test," and "could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the
test.") (emphasis added).
236. See supra note 233.
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family.237 To admit that there is coercion but to then deny that there
is legally cognizable compulsion is an affront to fifth amendment

values.

Neville also overlooks a second reality of contemporary implied
consent laws, the change since Schmerber in the climate in which such
laws are enforced. Public consciousness of the drunk driver problem

may have reached the point at which denial of basic civil liberties
is not only tolerated but is openly promoted.238 The American people
are demanding that the police take whatever measures are necessary

to eradicate the highly visible and universally condemned phenomenon
of the drunk driver. It is facile to think that these pressures will not

lead to a predisposition on the part of police, prosecutors and jurors

to maximize DUIA convictions regardless of any threat to rights of
freedom from persecution or to a fair, impartial determination of

guilt. Neville manifests no understanding of the practical likelihood
that coercive tactics will be employed at the pre-testing stage of drunk

driving prosecutions to obtain such convictions.239
Finally, the reaffirmation of Schmerber in Neville gives no con-

sideration to the legislative proliferation of implied consent laws since
1966. Adoption of these statutes may require greater procedural pro-

tections than those recognized by Schmerber. In another context the
Court has found that state creation of statutory rights imposes constitutional restraints which might not otherwise be necessary. 2"" Even

237. The courts acknowledge that the loss of a driver's license can be a weighty
hardship. For example, the Mackey Court stated that: "[T]he driver's interest . .
. in continued possession and use of his license . . .is a substantial one, for the
Commonwealth will not be able to make a driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered" by even a temporary loss of driving privileges.
443 U.S. at 11. See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977) ("Unlike . . .
social security recipients ... who at least could obtain retroactive payments if their
claims were subsequently sustained, a licensee is not made entirely whole if his suspension or revocation is later vacated."); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (failure
to afford a petitioner a prior hearing on liability denied him procedural due process).
238. See, e.g., supra note 115 describing the recent police practice of random
roadblocks.
239. Cf. Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The Case
Against Implied Consent, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 935, 956 (1980). This article proposes
the repeal of all implied consent laws so that the state may return to a pure RochinBreithaupt-Schmerberapproach of physically coercing participation in testing. One
may wonder whether the Neville Court's restrictive view of the procedural rights
of the DUIA suspect would continue to prevail if the police were to routinely use
physical force to gain submission to BAC testing.
240. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955). The issue in Griffin was whether
indigent defendants were denied equal protection and due process by a state practice
limiting the availability of free stenographic transcripts of trial proceedings to defen-
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though a Schmerber defendant may have no right to resist the "safe,
painless, and commonplace" blood extraction procedure, 4 ' the introduction of an implied consent choice and its coercive underpinnings require a inuch closer examination of the constitutional implications of the system than that offered in Neville.
In the final analysis, the Schmerber line of cases, together with
Neville probably foreclose a viable fifth amendment challenge to the
testing procedures of implied consent laws. Whether based on the
nontestimonial character of the evidence produced or the absence of
legally cognizable compulsion, it is very unlikely that federal courts
will find a need for access to counsel at the BAC testing phase under
this amendment.2 42 The completely unrealistic nature of the Court's
approach to this issue makes it imperative that state courts broadly
interpret state constitutional protections against self-incrimination to
2 43
fill the dangerous gaps created by South Dakota v. Neville.
dants sentenced to death. Such a procedure effectively foreclosed appellate review
of trial errors by means of a writ of error. Id. at 13-14. In declaring this practice
unconstitutional, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Black for four members of
the Court, and a concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter, placed great emphasis
on the constitutional consequences of the State of Illinois' adoption of a system
of appellate review, a step it was not compelled to take.
[A] State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.
Id. at 18. Justice Frankfurter continued:
[Ilt is now settled that due process of law does not require a State to afford
review of criminal judgments ....
Nor does equal protection of the laws
deny a State the right to make classifications . . . when such classifications
are rooted in reason. . . . [But] Illinois has decreed that only defendants

who can afford to pay for the stenographic minutes of a trial may have
trial errors reviewed on appeal. It has thereby shut off means of appellate
review for indigent defendants.
Id. at 21-23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
241. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
242. State courts have consistently rejected fifth amendment challenges to the
BAC testing process. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 779,
438 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1982); State v. Charette, 110 R.I. 124, 132, 290 A.2d 858, 862
(1972); Rodriguez v. State, 631 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1982). The
primary approach has been to treat the results of breathalyzer tests as real or physical
evidence and thus admissible under Schmerber. See, e.g., Brennan, 386 Mass. at
777, 438 N.E.2d at 65; Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Mo. 1967); State
v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 821, 639 P.2d 1320, 1325 (1982); State v. Driver, 59
Wis. 2d 35, 38, 207 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1975); see also Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20,
140 N.W.2d 603 (1966); Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J. Super. 279, 235 A.2d 37 (1967).
243. Utilization of state constitutional provisions to afford procedural protec-
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IV.

SPECIFIC CONTOURS OF A RIGHT OF ACCESS

One important restriction on a right of access, its temporal limitation to a reasonable period after which the accused must make an
independent decision on submission to a BAC test, has already been
identified in this article.""4 If it is accepted that the United States
Constitution requires an opportunity to consult with counsel along
the lines proposed in the article, two additional limitations must be
considered. It must be determined whether the police should be required to advise an in-custody DUIA suspect of the right to an
opportunity to obtain legal advice and whether police noncompliance
with the rule, by failure to advise or to provide reasonable access,
should lead to dismissal of DUIA charges or to some lesser sanction.
A.

DUTY TO INFORM

This article has presented three alternative theoretical bases for
a limited right of access to legal advice at the BAC testing stage of
a DUIA prosecution. Recognition of a fifth2" 5 or sixth amendment 2"
right, or a synthesized form of due process protection,247 premised
on the critical nature of this stage and the importance of legal advice, should carry with it a duty to inform the accused of the existence of the right.24 8 The proposition that a procedural right is not
tions broader than those established by the United States Supreme Court is discussed
at supra note 53. State courts have thus far not displayed a willingness to interpret
state constitutional protections against self-incrimination to provide greater protection than that offered by the fifth amendment. See generally Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 438 N.E.2d 60 (1982); State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 639
P.2d 1320 (1982); Rodriguez v. State, 631 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1982);
State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 336 A.2d 246 (1975).
However, in State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), rev'd and remanded,
103 S. Ct. 916 (1983), aff'd,.346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984), the South Dakota Supreme
Court interpreted the state constitutional provision against self-incrimination to have
a wider scope of protection than that provided by the federal constitution. Thus,
on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the state court affirmed its previous
ruling that a refusal to submit to BAC testing falls within the protection of the state
constitution.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 196-243.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 145-95.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 61-144.
248. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 483-85, 491 (1964) (failure to advise
suspect of right to remain silent at commencement of interrogation precludes valid
waiver of fifth amendment privilege), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466-74
(1966) (police must in every case inform in-custody suspect of right to remain silent,
to presence of counsel, and to appointment of counsel if indigent, prior to questioning) are most illuminative on the importance of the duty to warn. See generally Oregon
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meaningful unless its beneficiary is aware of it would seem too obvious to question. The right-of-access cases24 9 and Neville v. South
Dakota,25 ° however, require some comment on the duty to inform.
Courts addressing a claimed right of access have not been
presented with a direct opportunity to rule on the warning question
since the issue has uniformly originated in the police denial of an
explicit request of a DUIA suspect to contact a lawyer.25 ' It is argued
that a constitutional violation occurs when the accused is required
by the state to make critical decisions and face wide-ranging criminal
consequences without any form of legal assistance. Unlike the post-Fitzsimmons2"2 and post-Newton253 lines of cases, which examine the right
v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983), wherein a plurality of the Supreme Court held
that initiation of communication with police after invocation of Miranda rights was
not a per se waiver of those rights. The reasons for requiring affirmative warnings
of Miranda rights include the simple necessity of making sure the accused is aware
of these rights and, more importantly, to overcome "the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 470-71.
249. See, e.g., State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 807, 811, 636 P.2d 393, 404, 407
(1981) ("discouragement of . . . request for counsel" found to be an unconstitu-

tional restraint on suspect's liberty; police are not required, however, to "itemize
to a [suspect] all the actions he is free to take nor to provide .

.

. [a] person with

the means to exercise his freedom.") (emphasis added); accord, Moore v. State, 293
Or. 715, 722, 652 P.2d 794, 799 (1982) (Newton prohibits unjustified failure to respect
the request of a suspect who "asks to speak to counsel.") (emphasis added); Copelin
v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Alaska 1983) (statutory rights of access to counsel
violated by police denial of requests to speak with attorney); State ex rel. Juckett
v. Evergreen Dist. Ct., 32 Wash. App. 49, 54, 645 P.2d 734, 737 (1982) (Fitzsimmons established a right of access to counsel, but not an affirmative .duty on state
to advise drivers of that right); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d
893, vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 959
(1980) (reasonable access to counsel necessary only "if . . . [a] request is timely.")

(emphasis added); cf. State v. Wurm, 32 Wash. App. 258, 268, 647 P.2d 508, 512-14

(1982) (Mclnturff, C.J., dissenting) (accused must be informed of right of access

before testing, regardless of request). See generally Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F.
Supp. 646, 649, 651 (D.S.D.), vacated and remanded, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982)
(district court's holding phrased in terms of importance of allowing suspect to contact counsel without emphasis on significance of request to consult).
250. 103 S. Ct. 918, 923-24 (1983) (no denial of fundamental fairness in admitting evidence of refusal to test without specifically warning suspect that such refusal
could be used at trial as proof of guilt of DUIA charges).
251. See supra note 250; see also State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116, 1118 n.4 (Me.

1983) (Maine implied consent law does not require opportunity for consultation with
attorney prior to testing when requested by suspect).
252. State ex rel. Juckett v. Evergreen Dist. Ct., 32 Wash. App. 49, 54-55, 645
P.2d 734, 737 (1982); State v. Halbakken, 30 Wash. App. 834, 638 P.2d 584 (1981).
253. Moore v. State, Motor Vehicles Div., 293 Or. 715, 722, 652 P.2d 794,
799 (1982).
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in terms of the constitutional implications of refusing to honor a request to consult, the proposed right is an affirmative one based on
the vulnerability of the DUIA suspect. It is precisely because the accused is not likely to appreciate the need for legal assistance and,

therefore, will not ask for it, that an affirmative right must be
established.2"' In the final analysis, to condition the existence of a
right of access on the fortuity of the accused's request for counsel
undercuts the reasons for a right in the first place."'

Neville was premised on an interdependence between the duty
to warn and the existence of legal rights, and held that it was not
a denial of due process to admit a suspect's refusal to test as evidence
of guilt of a DUIA charge.2"6 The theory behind the due process claim
was that fundamental fairness required the police to warn the accused
of this consequence of refusal prior to demanding that the testing
choice be made.2" The surface rationale for rejecting this position

was that, unlike the prohibition in Doyle v. Ohio"' on the use of
post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment purposes at trial,259
the advice given a DUIA suspect pursuant to implied consent laws
contains no "implicit" assurances that no adverse consequences would
result from a refusal or that the only legal consequence of a refusal

to test would be loss of license.2'" In the absence of any unfair "trick"

prior to the accused's decision or in subsequent use of refusal evidence
at trial, no due process violations occur. 26 '

254. Miranda makes the point most succinctly in a fifth amendment context.
"The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request
may be the person who most needs counsel." 384 U.S. at 470-71.
255. See, e.g., People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr.
169 (1965). The court stated:
[W]e must recognize that the imposition of the requirement for the request
would discriminate against the defendant who does not know his rights.
The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who
most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and by such
failure demonstrates his helplessness. To require the request would be to
favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted
him to make it.
Id. at 351, 398 P.2d at 369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78 (footnote omitted).
256. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
257. Id.
258. 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
259. See Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923-24. The Court in Neville distinguished Doyle
on the grounds that it involved a direct application of the constitutionally-based
Miranda warnings and that these warnings gave "no warning of adverse consequences
from choosing to remain silent." Id.
260. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 924.
261. Id.
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The Neville Court's unwillingness to impose a duty to warn is
more specifically traceable to its concept of implied consent laws. Given
the Court's earlier treatment of Schmerber,2 62 it is not surprising to
find the rights created by these laws and the information supplied
thereunder characterized as "simply a matter of grace bestowed by
the . . . legislature. 2 63 This is, in effect, the suggestion that for constitutional purposes no rights inhere in the testing choice process.
Clearly, in this view of the process, if there are no substantial rights
at stake there is no need to warn the suspect of possible future legal
consequences of decisions made at this stage.
In contrast to the Neville conception, this article has postulated
that there are significant statutory and constitutional rights involved
at the BAC testing stage which require for their protection access to
legal advice. If Neville is construed to mean that, where there is no
duty to warn a suspect of the consequences of his actions there is
no need for legal advice on those consequences, then the analytical
sequence is improperly reversed. The better approach is for courts
to first scrutinize the totality of circumstances existing at the BAC
testing stage to determine what the rights and obligations of the suspect
are. If those circumstances require a right of access to counsel, the
accused must be informed of that right.
B.

SANCTIONS FOR DENIAL OF ACCESS

A constitutionally-based right of access to counsel imposes a duty
on the police to inform the DUIA suspect of his right to seek legal
advice and to provide a reasonable opportunity for him to do so.
The sanction or remedy that should attach to a failure of the police
to meet these obligations is the final question to be addressed.
Various approaches have been taken by those courts which have
found a violation of the right of access. In the criminal context, potential sanctions have included reversal of a DUIA conviction and
dismissal of all charges,2"4 exclusion of evidence obtained subsequent
262. Id. at 920-21. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), was characterized as rejecting a fifth amendment challenge to the taking of a blood test based on a finding
that such a test produced " 'physical or real' evidence rather than testimonial
evidence." The Court went on to extend this conclusion to mean that the state can
"force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol
test." Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 920-21.
263. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 924.
264. State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 451, 610 P.2d 893, 901-02, vacated
and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, aff'd, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980). The
court cited its earlier decision in Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 751, 409 P.2d
867, 874 (1966), in concluding that the denial of access to counsel caused the suspect
to suffer "irreparable prejudice" which precluded there ever being a fair trial.
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to a denial of access," ' and application of a "harmless error" standard to the totality of evidence in the case. 66 In civil or administrative
license revocation proceedings, the remedy has been judicial invalidation of the revocation and reinstatement of driving privileges.1 67
Any remedy for infringement of the right to an opportunity to
consult with counsel must be responsive to the reasons for establishing
the right. It has been demonstrated that the failure to provide access
to legal advice may so prejudice the rights of a DUIA suspect that
either a criminal conviction or civil loss of license is fundamentally
unfair. 8 The only effective method of eliminating this unfairness is
to remove the harmful consequences of a refusal to provide access
by reversing the conviction or reinstating the driver's license. 69 Any
265. Compare Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 451, 610 P.2d at 902 (rejecting suppression as having "no real ameliorative effect" on the violation of the defendant's
right) with State v. Newton, 291 Or. at 818, 636 P.2d at 407 (refusing to require
exclusion of breath sample because no causal relationship existed between denial of
access to counsel and subsequent submission to test; record failed to show that accused could have obtained legal advice if given opportunity to make telephone call).
See Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1214-15 (Alaska 1983) (suppression required
where denial of statutory right of access "has an effect on the defendant's ability
to present- a defense at trial").
In Prideaux v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385
(1976), the court stated:
When the driver has been coerced into making a complicated decision without
the assistance of counsel required by this opinion [interpreting state statute],
he should not be bound by that decision, since he might have otherwise
made it differently. Therefore, if such a driver elected to take the test, the
results should be suppressed.
Id. at 422, 247 N.W.2d at 385; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(4966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961).
266. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 452-53, 610 P.2d at 902-03.
267. See, e.g., Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. at 654. The plaintiff's
original complaint sought, inter alia, a permanent injunction against the state's revocation of driving privileges. Id. at 649 n.2. It appears that by the time the federal
court suit was instituted, the one year suspension of driving privileges affirmed by
the state court had expired. See State v. Heles, 272 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1978);
State v. Braunesreither, 276 N.W.2d 139, 140 (S.D. 1979). The district court thus
struck the request for injunctive relief as moot and sua sponte treated the action
as merely one for declaratory relief. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 649 n.2. In view of
the court's ultimate disposition of the issues, it is clear that Heles' driving privileges
would have been reinstated. Id. at 654; see also Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich.
App. 431, 441, 231 N.W.2d 396, 400 (1975).
268. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
269. The remedy of exclusion of BAC testing results is too narrow to address
the dangers inherent in the overall pre-testing process. The potential harm to the
DUIA suspect includes not only mistaken submission to the test but also the possible
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other remedy would fail to protect the rights of the suspect or give
proper respect to the constitutional foundations of a right of access.
V.

CONCLUSION

Implied consent laws and the proliferating new "get tough" drunk
driving statutes represent a valid public policy response to a very serious
problem. This article has proposed a slight but important modification in the procedures utilized for enforcement of these laws. A right
of access to counsel based on the fifth amendment, sixth amendment,
or, most appropriately, the fourteenth amendment due process clause,
would require no more than that a DUIA suspect be afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain vital advice and information when it is
most needed. Such a limited right would serve the historic purposes
of all constitutional procedural protections- safeguarding individual
liberty without sacrificing the public good.

loss of an opportunity to establish trial defenses or legal justifications for refusing
to test. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text. The author recognizes that
even the lesser sanction of exclusion is in great disfavor and may soon be removed
from the existing body of federal constitutional law by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)(exclusionary rule should not bar evidence
obtained pursuant to reasonable reliance on search warrant subsequently found to
be invalid). Nonetheless, in the special circumstances of implied consent drunk driving prosecutions, the most complete and effective sanction for denial of access to
legal advice remains dismissal of charges or reversal of license revocations.

